Should a Non-Designing Manufacturer
Be Held Strictly Liable for a Design
Defect? An Approach for California*
When a manufacturer conforms to a buyers design in building
a product, and the product causes irifury to a person because of a
design defect, the question arises as to whether the manufacturer
should be held strictly liable. Although the California Supreme
Court has not addressed this question, two other states have taken
conflicting approaches. The "Nebraska Rule" refuses to hold a
non-designing manufacturer strictly liable for a design defect absent
proof of fault. Conversely, the "New Jersey Rule" holds a nondesigning manufacturer strictly liable for a design defect regardless
of fault. This Comment contrasts these two rules in light of the
policies and justifications behind both strict liability theory and
traditional tort law theory. Based on this analysis, the Author
recommends that the California Supreme Court adopt the rationale
of the Nebraska Rule. Furthermore, the Author argues that the
Nebraska Rule is actually more compatible with California s current
strict liability standards, which resemble a fault-based system.
Finally, the Author argues that the Nebraska Rule complements
California :S recent refusal to continue the expansion of strict
products liability.
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Comment recommends how the California Supreme Court should
treat a situation in which a person is injured by a product that has a
defective design, but the design is specified by the buyer, not the
manufacturer. In other words, should a manufacturer be held strictly

• I would like to thank Professor Michael Kelly for his invaluable insight and
assistance. Special thanks also to Steve Mitchell and Pamela Everett. This Comment
is dedicated to my mother, for giving me the gift of self-expression, and to my father,
for giving me the courage to use it.
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liable for injuries that are caused by a design defect when the manufacturer complied with the plans and specifications of the buyer? A more
specific situation to be addressed is one in which the injured party is an
employee of the buyer. How would the presence of worker's compensation factor into the cause of action based on strict products liability and
what effect would it have on the plaintiff's choice of the potential
defendants?
The inquiry will focus on manufacturers who produce custom-made
products according to the specifications of non-governmental buyers.
The manufacturers in this context are non-designing manufacturers; they
are excluded from the buyer's designing process. In recommending an
approach for the California Supreme Court on this issue, the decisions
of two other state supreme courts will be examined to illustrate the sharp
contrast that exists on the issue. These major approaches are called the
"Nebraska Rule" and the "New Jersey Rule." The Nebraska Rule finds
a non-designing manufacturer liable for a design defect only upon proof
that the manufacturer was at fault for following the buyer's design.
Conversely, the New Jersey Rule holds that a non-designing manufacturer is strictly liable for a design defect, even if the manufacturer was not
at fault for following the buyer's design. These rules will be evaluated
and compared in order to demonstrate how well each rule approximates
the goals behind tort liability.
Although the California Supreme Court has not had the occasion to
address the issue of whether a non-designing manufacturer can be held
strictly liable for a design defect, the court is well-known for its broad
application of strict liability. A ruling on this issue would, however, be
of particular importance for three reasons. First, in contrast to
California's comprehensive expansion of strict liability over the past
several decades, the court has recently begun to limit its application; this
particular issue is a potential avenue for the court's retreat from strict
liability. Second, the notion of holding a non-designing manufacturer
strictly liable for defects in a design is repugnant not only to traditional
tort theory, but to common sense. Third, California's strict liability test
for determining whether a design is defective resembles a standard based
on fault, much like the Nebraska Rule. Therefore, this Comment
recommends that the California Supreme Court adopt a position similar
to the Nebraska Rule and refuse to hold a non-designing manufacturer
strictly liable for design defects when the manufacturer was not at fault
for following a buyer's plans and specifications. The discussion begins
with a background examination of the evolution of strict products
liability.
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II.

A

BRIEF HISTORY OF STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY

Strict liability is liability without fault. 1 The imposition of liability
without fault has a legacy that extends back to the English Exchequer
Chamber in the 19th Century. Early English cases held defendants
strictly liable for damages caused by explosions. 2 After initial judicial
reluctance to impose liability without fault,3 the application of strict
liability entered into the courts of the United States. 4 In the beginning
of the twentieth century American tort law began adopting compensation
policies; tort law expanded, providing greater recovery. For instance,
shortly after American courts displayed a willingness to impose strict
liability in explosion cases, the "privity of contract" requirement in
negligence cases was abolished. Manufacturers were held liable under
a negligence theory to persons who were injured by the manufacturer's
product, notwithstanding the fact that the person lacked privity of
contract with the manufacturer. 5
After the abolition of the privity of contract requirement, manufacturers were rendered susceptible to strict liability for injuries caused by
defective products. 6 American tort law espoused a policy of compensating the victims of tortious acts, thus departing from the traditional
practice of holding parties liable only upon proof of fault. Legal
I. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1422 (6th ed. 1990). From a theoretical
standpoint, a case holding a manufacturer liable for design defects, when the design has
been drafted by a party other than the manufacturer, is the purest form of liability
without fault.
2. Fletcher v. Rylands, I L.R. 265 (Ex. Ch. I 866), ajf'd, Rylands v. Fletcher, 3
L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (H.L. 1868).
3. See, e.g., Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476 (1873) (holding that a party who
operates a steam boiler will not be held liable for damages if the boiler explodes and
causes injury unless there is proof of fault); see also Richard B. Stewart, Crisis in Tort
Law? The Institutional Perspective, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 184, 186 (1987) ("American tort
law from the late nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century was understood
primarily in terms of corrective justice.").
4. Sullivan v. Dunham, 55 N.E. 923 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1900) (holding a party liable
without proof of fault). In Sullivan, the defendants lawfully created an explosion on
their property. The blast sent a large chunk of wood flying over an adjacent field where
it struck and killed a woman walking by. Id. at 924. The defendants had exercised due
care, but the court nevertheless held them liable on "public policy" grounds. Id. at 926.
But cf Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476 (1873).
5. E.g., MacPhearson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1916).
6. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 ( I 963) (holding that manufacturers are strictly liable for defective products).
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scholars began to recognize that this system would be beneficial to both
the social and economic needs of society. 7 As Professor James
explained, "Strict liability is to be preferred over a system of liability
based on fault wherever you have an enterprise or activity, beneficial to
many, which takes a more or less inevitable accident toll of human life
and limb." 8 The underlying rationale was that an injured individual was
far less capable of redressing the costs of accidents than the manufacturer, who could spread the loss as a cost of doing business. 9
The California Supreme Court has been at the forefront of developing
strict products liability in the United States. This legal evolution was
predominately motivated by the concern that consumers were not able
to protect themselves against injuries caused by defective products. 10
Justice Roger Traynor first expressed this notion in a concurring opinion
in Esco/a v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno. 11 Justice Traynor's
rationale was founded on public policy demands, which included placing
the responsibility for injuries caused by defective products where it
would "most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in
defective products." 12 To be sure, Justice Traynor's concern was for
the consumer who suffered injury from these products, as "[t]he cost of
an injury ... may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured,
and a needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the
manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing
business." 13 This would be the philosophy of the California Supreme
Court for decades to come.
Nineteen years after Esco/a, Justice Traynor, writing for a majority of
the court, held that "[a] manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an
article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without
inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a

7. The objective of the modem tort system is no longer condemning blameworthy
behavior, but advancing social welfare through compensation. See Stewart, supra note
3, at 186, 190. Thus came the advent of enterprise liability, discussed infra part V.B.
8. Fleming James, Jr., General Products - Should Manufacturers Be Liable
Without Negligence?, 24 TENN. L. REV. 923, 923 (1957). For an historical discussion
of Professor James' contribution to modem tort law scholarship, see George L. Priest,
The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations
of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 465-83 (1985).
9. See infra notes 119-57 and accompanying text.
10. Greenman, 59 Cal. 2d at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701; see also
Stephanie M. Wildman & Molly Farrell, Strict Products Liability in California: An
Ideological Overview, I 9 U.S.F. L. REv. 139 (I 984-85).
11. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
12. Id. at 462, 150 P.2d at 440.
13. Id.
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human being." 14 Manufacturers soon after were held strictly liable for
defects in a variety of situations and on a multiplicity of theories,
including failure to warn cases, 15 design defect cases, 16 manufacturing
defect cases, 17 and in cases where the manufacturer failed to provide
adequate safety devices. 18 Strict products liability in California also
expanded to hold retailers, 19 wholesalers,20 and lessors 21 strictly
liable under the same theories. Indeed, an injured plaintiff was given a
vast array of alternatives in seeking recovery for injuries caused by a
faulty product. Strict liability was further extended to "license to use"
cases. In one case, strict liability was applied to hold an owner of a
laundromat strictly liable for injuries resulting from a defective washing
machine. 22
California courts have experienced a trend of expanding strict liability
and the virtual abandonment of contract theory2 3 in decisions involving

14. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 377 P.2d 897, 900,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1963).
15. Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 273 Cal. App. 2d 44, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552
(1965); see also Rawlings v. D.M. Oliver, Inc., 97 Cal. App. 3d 890, 159 Cal. Rptr. 119
(1979) (holding that a manufacturer may be strictly liable for its failure to warn of the
potential hazards in using the product); cf Powell v. Standard Brands Paint Co., 166 Cal.
App. 3d 357, 212 Cal. Rptr. 395 (1985) (noting that a manufacturer's duty is restricted
to warnings about the manufacturer's own product).
16. See. e.g., Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 470, 467 P.2d 229, 232,
85 Cal. Rptr. 629, 632 (1970) (quoting Varas v. Barco Mfg. Co., 205 Cal. App. 2d 246,
22 Cal. Rptr. 737 (1962)).
17. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1963); see also Dart Equip. Corp. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 9 Cal. App. 3d 837,
88 Cal. Rptr. 670 ( 1970).
18. See, e.g., Titus v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 91 Cal. App. 3d 372, 154 Cal. Rptr.
122 ( 1979) (holding that a product may be deemed defective if it fails to include a safety
device necessary for its reasonable safety).
19. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256,391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr.
896 (1964).
20. E.g., Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 22~, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306
(1968).
21. Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245,466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970).
22. Garcia v. Halsett, 3 Cal. App. 3d 3 I 9, 82 Cal. Rptr. 420 ( I970).
23. Insofar as "contract theory" is concerned, the requirement of privity of contract
as a prerequisite for recovering for personal injuries caused by defective products has
been abolished. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. However, recovery for
economic injury in the sale of goods is governed by the notion of implied warranties, a
contract principle.
Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the goods shall
be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a
merchant with respect to goods of that kind .... Goods to be merchantable
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injuries that are caused by defective products. As far as the bargaining
process is concerned, a manufacturer cannot avoid the imposition of
strict liability, even at the outset of any dealings. A clause in a contract
that purports to absolve the manufacturer from any future strict liability
claims is not valid24 because the injured party's claim falls under the
law of strict liability in tort, not contract.
With that approach in mind, it seems almost axiomatic that a
manufacturer in California that expressly contracts with a buyer to
produce a product in accordance with the buyer's plans and specifications will ultimately be susceptible to strict liability for injuries arising
out of that product's design defects. If a strict liability claim is one that
necessarily falls under tort law, 25 the fact that the two parties explicitly
contracted that the manufacturer follow the buyer's plan seems to be of
little relevance. 26 More importantly, the public policy of victim

must be at least such as ... are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such
goods are used.
U.C.C. § 2-314(1), (2)(c) (1977); see also id.§ 2-315 (implied warranty where the seller
knows of both the buyer's purpose and the buyer's reliance on the seller's skill); id. § 2316 (Exclusion or Modification of Warranties). An injured plaintiff may bring a
products liability cause of action based on express or implied warranties as well. See
Hauter v. Zogarts, 14 Cal. 3d 104, 534 P.2d 377, 120 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1975). But cf.
Airlift Int'!, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 685 F.2d 267 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding
that as a matter of California law, strict liability in tort does not apply between large
commercial entities who have bargained for the allocation of the risk). Also, courts have
held that the doctrine of strict liability has not superseded recovery with respect to the
warranty provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code. See Seely v. White Motor Co.,
63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
24. E.g., Dart Equip. Corp. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 9 Cal. App. 3d 837, 848, 88 Cal.
Rptr. 670, 677 (I 970); Crane v. Sears Roebuck & Co., Inc., 218 Cal. App. 2d 855, 860,
32 Cal. Rptr. 754, 757 (I 963). Nevertheless, an indemnity clause in a contract that
addresses the specific type of liability involved will be upheld by most courts. Hence,
the party that suffers an adverse judgment will remain liable, but the indemnity action
will restore that party financially. However, in the context ofnon-designing manufacturers that comply with a buyer's design, the courts have stringent standards regarding the
permissibility of indemnity actions. See infra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
This is due to the presence of worker's compensation liability limits whenever an
employee is injured. See infra notes 160-67 and accompanying text.
25. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1963). In Greenman, a manufacturer defendant argued that because the
plaintiff did not comply with notice requirements under a statutory breach of warranty
remedy, the plaintiff could not recover. The court noted, however, that the plaintiff did
not need to rely on breach of warranty to recover. Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal.
Rptr. at 700. Breach of warranty, a contract remedy, was not needed because the
plaintiffs claim for injuries was in tort. As the court held, "[strict] liability is not one
governed by the law of contract warranties but by the law of strict liability in tort." Id.
at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
26. See id. ("[L]iability is not assumed by agreement but imposed by law ....").
A common sense rebuttal would be that the buyer wanted something a certain way and
the manufacturer simply carried out the buyer's wish. Thus, the manufacturer should
not be blamed, even in a tort action, if the design is inept. However, even the courts
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compensation is so compelling that such a manufacturer would inevitably
be a potential defendant in order to provide a plaintiff more sources of
recovery. As Professor James explained, "the risk of loss from
dangerously defective products [should] be put upon (and distributed by)
the producer rather than upon the consumer or innocent bystander, even
where the producer is also innocent." 27 The California Supreme Court
embraced this rationale again in Becker v. IRM Corp., 28 where in his
majority opinion Justice Broussard explained that "[t]he paramount
policy of the strict products liability rule" is to compensate injured
victims by spreading the loss throughout society. 29 When juxtaposed
with the California Supreme Court's stringent public policy convictions,
a non-designing manufacturer that complies with a buyer's specifications
seems to be a viable candidate for strict liability in design defect cases.
The California Supreme Court has not had the occasion to address
this issue. However, in the face of rapidly expanding strict liability,
California courts have recently shown a degree of hesitation to apply
strict liability liberally to manufacturers in every instance where injury
is caused by a product that is in some respect defective. For example,
in Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiber Glass Corp.,3° the California
Supreme Court asserted that "[s]trict liability ... was never intended to
make the manufacturer ... of a product its insurer." 31 Justice Panelli,
writing for the majority in Anderson, added that "strict liability has never
been, and is not now, absolute liability ...." 32 Under this rationale,
it seems as if a court would resist holding a manufacturer that merely
carries out a buyer's plans and specifications strictly liable to a plaintiff
who is injured by a design defect. On the surface, such a manufacturer

that preclude the application of strict liability to such a manufacturer will hold that
liability will be imposed if the buyer's specifications are so obviously defective that an
ordinary and reasonable manufacturer in a similar situation would not have followed
them. See infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
27. James, supra note 8, at 927 (emphasis added). It should be noted, in all
fairness, that Professor James qualified this quotation somewhat with the following
sentence: "This enterprise liability should not be unlimited, but it should extend to all
casualties and hazards that are injected into society by the activity of the enterprise, at
least to the extent that they are reasonably foreseeable." Id. (emphasis added).
28. 38 Cal. 3d 454, 698 P.2d 116, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1985) (en bane).
29. Id. at 466, 698 P.2d at 123, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 220.
30. 53 Cal. 3d 987, 810 P.2d 549, 281 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1991) (en bane).
31. Id. at 994, 810 P.2d at 552,281 Cal. Rptr. at 531.
32. Id. (quoting Daly v. Gen. Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 733, 575 P.2d 1162,
1166, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 384 (1978)).
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has no reasonable connection with the design; intuitively, strict liability
in this instance would be in fact absolute liability.
However, the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District
expressed a willingness to hold a manufacturer strictly liable for a design
defect, even when the manufacturer conformed to the buyer's plans and
specifications. 33 Four years later, the same court distinguished its
previous holding from a situation where the buyer is the federal
government, 34 yet nonetheless remained steadfast in maintaining that
strict liability could apply to a manufacturer in a case where the buyer
that provides the plans and specifications is not governmental. 35 These
initial holdings may not be undisputed precedent for this type of case
after the California Supreme Court's decision in Barker v. Lull Eng'g
Co., Inc., 36 which created a two-part test to determine whether a
product's design was in fact defective. This two-part test includes
factors that sound in negligence rather than strict liability. 37 A discus-

33. Rawlings v. D.M. Oliver, Inc., 97 Cal. App. 3d 890, 159 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1979).
Discussed infra part VI.A.
34. The issue of a non-designing manufacturer that complies with the plans and
specifications of a buyer is extremely different when the buyer is the federal government.
In essence, the manufacturer cannot be held liable for a design defect, regardless of
whether an action is based on strict liability or fault. This is known as the government
contractor defense. "[T]he defense allows the [manufacturer] to share in the
government's sovereign immunity upon proof that certain conditions were met." Terrie
Hanna, Note, The Government Contractor Defense and the Impact of Boyle v. United
Technologies Corporation, 70 B.U. L. REv. 691, 691 (1990). These conditions have
been set by the United States Supreme Court as a matter of federal common law.
Liability for design defects in military equipment cannot be imposed [on
manufacturers], pursuant to state law, when
(I) the United States approved reasonably precise specifications;
(2) the equipment conformed to those specifications; and
(3) the supplier warned the United States about the dangers in the use of the
equipment that were known to the supplier but not to the United States.
Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988). Thus, when the buyer/designer
is the federal government, the debate over whether a non-designing manufacturer should
be held to a strict liability standard or a fault standard is moot. For further discussion
about the government contractor defense, see Ronald A. Cass & Clayton P. Gillette, The
Government Contractor Defense: Contractual Allocation ofPublic Risk, 77 VA. L. REV.
257 (1991); Neil G. Wolf, Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.: A Reasonably Precise
Immunity-Specifying the Defense Contractor's Shield, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 825 (1990).
35. See McLaughlin v. Sikorsky Aircraft, 148 Cal. App. 3d 203, 208-09, 211-12
n.4, 195 Cal. Rptr. 764, 766, 768 n.4 (1983). "[T]he formula for recovery for a defective
product has no exception stated in a California case for those conforming to customer
specifications .... " Id. at 218, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 773 (Cologne, J., concurring and
dissenting).
36. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
37. The two Barker standards do not superficially focus on a manufacturer's
conduct. Yet each standard each implicitly attaches blame to a defendant that does not
meet its requirements. Consider the language employed by the Barker court:
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sion of these cases will be postponed until after a review of other state
supreme court decisions squarely addressing design defect cases
involving non-designing manufacturers. 38

III.

THE NEBRASKA

RULE

The Nebraska Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a
manufacturer that complies with the plans and specifications of a nongovernmental buyer can be held strictly liable for design defects in Moon
v. Winger Boss Co., Jnc. 39 The court ultimately resolved the issue by
[I]n design defect cases, a court may properly instruct a jury that a product is
defective in design if(I) the plaintiff proves that the product failed to perform
as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or
reasonably foreseeable manner, or (2) the plaintiff proves that the product's
design proximately caused injury and the defendant fails to prove, in light of
the relevant factors, that on balance the benefits of the challenged design
outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design.
Id. at 426-27, 573 P.2d at 452, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 234. For a discussion of Barker, see
infra part VI. B.2.
38. For a concise discussion of the varying rationales, both within state and federal
courts, regarding the application of strict liability to non-designing manufacturers in
design defect cases, see I MARSHALL s. SHAPO, THE LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY -,i
12.10(1) (2d ed. 1990); LEWIS BASS, PRODUCTS LIABILITY - DESIGN & MANUFACTURING DEFECTS § 4.20 ( 1986).
39. 287 N.W.2d 430 (Neb. 1980). The Nebraska Supreme Court recognizes that
a defective design can be the basis for a cause of action in either strict liability or
conunon law negligence. Kohler v. Ford Motor Co., 191 N.W.2d 601 (Neb. 1971); see
also Moon, 287 N.W.2d at 432 (citing Hancock v. Paccar, Inc., 283 N.W.2d 25 (Neb.
1979) as authority for applying strict liability in design defect cases). For a thorough
discussion of the development of strict products liability in the Nebraska Supreme Court,
see Francis J. Reida, Comment, Strict Products Liability in Nebraska--Nebraska 's
Defective Test for Detecting Product Defects: Rahmig v. Mosley Machinery Co., 22
CREIGHTON L. REV. 535 (1988).
In Nebraska, a plaintiff must prove six elements in order to recover on a claim of strict
liability for a design defect:
(I) The manufacturer placed the product on the market and knew or should
have known that the product would be used without inspection for defects;
(2) the product was defective when it left the manufacturer's possession;
(3) the defect was the proximate cause of the injury;
(4) the defect made the product unreasonably dangerous;
(5) there was an alternative design that made the design safer; and
(6) the damages were a direct result of the defect.
Rahmig v. Mosley, 412 N.W.2d 56, 69 (Neb. 1987). The term "unreasonably
dangerous" has been defined by the Nebraska Supreme Court to mean a product that
"has a propensity for causing physical harm beyond that which would be contemplated
by the ordinary user or consumer .... " Nerud v. Haybuster Mfg., Inc., 340 N. W.2d
369, 375 (Neb. 1983), overruled on other grounds by Rahmig, 412 N.W.2d at 81.
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holding that a manufacturer is free from liability for design defects on
both claims of negligence and strict liability, unless the manufacturer
was at fault for following a defective design. 40 The final rule stated in
the opinion used language that suggested a straight negligence standard,
even with respect to the strict liability claim. Hence, the Nebraska rule
requires a showing of fault on the part of the manufacturer who complies
with a buyer's plans and specifications, notwithstanding the fact that the
cause of action is one in strict liability. In other words, under the
Nebraska Rule, strict liability---liability without fault-actually requires
a certain degree of fault by the manufacturer; a non-designing manufacturer following the instructions of a buyer is not necessarily at fault just
because the design itself is defective.

A.

The Facts

In Moon, the plaintiff worked near an assembly line at a meat
processing plant owned by Iowa Beef. 41 After a fall, his arm became
entangled in a "pinch point" where a chain and sprocket merged in a
conveyor system called a "breaking table."42 After the accident, screen
guards were placed over the pinch points, but prior to the plaintiff's
accident, no safety devices were installed. Plaintiff brought an action
against the manufacturer, Winger Boss, based on negligence and strict
liability for design defects in the breaking table conveyor system.
The plaintiff maintained that the finished product had a defective
design because Winger Boss did not include a safety screen over the
pinch points. However, Winger Boss built the breaking table conveyor
system in strict compliance with the specifications of Iowa Beef.
Winger Boss had been invited to bid43 on the manufacture of several
breaking tables, including the one that injured the plaintiff.44 The
contract was awarded to Winger Boss, but Winger Boss did not assist in

40. Moon, 287 N.W.2d at 434.
41. Id. at 431.
42. Iowa Beef Processors was also named as a defendant in the case. Because the
cause of action against Iowa Beef Processors was not of substantial relevance in the
Moon opinion, and because that cause of action is not pertinent to this Comment, it will
not be discussed.
43. For a discussion of the relevance of the bidding process, see infra note 130 and
accompanying text.
44. Moon. 287 N.W. 2d at 431. This process of bidding is characteristic of the
manner in which manufacturers who conform to a buyer's specifications get jobs. When
evaluating the policies behind applying strict liability to a non-designing manufacturer
for a design defect, the relevance of the bidding process is heightened. Because a major
policy behind strict liability is the concept of risk spreading, a manufacturer who
attempts to deflect liability costs upon customers will inevitably alter its position in the
bidding process. See infra notes 130, 155-56 and accompanying text.
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designing the product. Furthermore, Iowa Beef refused to give Winger
Boss a full layout of the section of the Iowa Beef plant where the
breaking tables were to be used. Thus, the conveyor system was
manufactured according to Iowa Beef's explicit plans and specifications,
which did not include a safety device over the pinch points. The District
Court entered judgment for Winger Boss and the plaintiff appealed.
B.

The Nebraska Supreme Court's Holding

The Nebraska Supreme Court acknowledged that although a cause of
action for strict liability existed in design defect cases, the court had
"never before considered the situation in which a manufacturer follows
completely the design of [its] employer."45 Initially, the court referred
to section 404 of the Second Restatement of Torts. Under the reasoning
of that section, an independent contractor who negligently makes a
product for another "is subject to the same liability as that imposed upon
negligent manufacturers of chattels."46 However, the court specifically
focused on comment a of section 404, which qualifies an independent
contractor's liability in a case where plans and specifications are
provided by the employer (buyer). 47 If a buyer provides the specifications, the manufacturer is not required to "sit in judgment" on those
specifications; the manufacturer is only liable for defects in the
specifications if the specifications are so bad that a reasonable manufacturer would refuse to follow them. 48 The court reasoned that because
Winger Boss did not participate in the design process of the breaking
table, it was not required to sit in judgment on the plans and specifications provided by Iowa Beef. 49

45. Moon, 287 N.W.2d at 432-33.
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 404 (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
47. Moon, 287 N.W.2d at 433.
48. RESTATEMENT, supra note 46, § 404 cmt. a. Under comment a,
[T]he contractor is not required to sit in judgment on the plans and specifications ... provided by his employer. The contractor is not subject to liability
if the specified design ... turns out to be insufficient to make the chattel safe
for use, unless it is so obviously bad that a competent contractor would realize
that there was a grave chance that [the] product would be dangerously unsafe.
Id. (emphasis added). Section 403 holds an independent contractor liable if the
contractor "knows or has reason to know" that its work is unsafe. Id. § 403. Section
404 deals with instances where a contractor is negligent. The quote of comment a above
then carves out an exception for cases where the design is supplied by a third party.
49. Moon, 287 N.W.2d at 433-34.
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The court refused to find Winger Boss strictly liable for the design
defect. Building on the rationale of section 404 and the accompanying
comment a, the court announced the Nebraska Rule for strict liability
cases involving a design defect and a non-designing manufacturer:
[A] manufacturer is not liable for injuries to a user of a product which it has
manufactured in accordance with plans and specifications of one other than the
manufacturer, except when the plans are so obviously, patently, or glaringly
dangerous that a manufacturer exercising ordinary care under the circumstances
then existing would not follow them. ,o

Ironically, the court relied on a 1963 California case, where the same
rationale was applied to a contractor who built a grandstand in accordance with the plans and specifications of an owner. 51 Builders have
generally been excused from liability in negligence cases when the
builder followed the plans and specifications of the owner. 52 As
articulated by the Moon court, such a contractor would be held liable
only if the plans and specifications were so inherently dangerous that
any ordinary and reasonable contractor would not follow them. 53 Fault
would rest with the contractor who followed unreasonable plans and

50. Id. at 434 (emphasis added).
51. Barnthouse v. California Steel Bldgs. Co., 215 Cal. App. 2d 72, 29 Cal. Rptr.
835 (I 963). The California Fourth District Court of Appeal pointed out that the
Barnthouse opinion was limited to situations involving a small builder in a negligence
action, where the owner supplied the plans and accepted the completed product. See
Rawlings v. D.M. Oliver, Inc., 97 Cal. App. 3d 890,896 n.l, 159 Cal. Rptr. 119, 121
n.l (1979).
52. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 104A, at 723-24 (5th ed. 1984). Keeton explains the theory by which building
contractors can be viewed as within the service industry, that is, a party "engaged
primarily in the rendition of a service." Id. at 724. Thus, in following the plans and
specifications of the owner, the building contractor provides a service and strict liability
is generally not applicable. See id. Yet some courts have expressed the notion that a
completed building or structure is actually a product and have thus imposed strict
liability on the building contractor. E.g., Worrell v. Barnes, 484 P.2d 573 (Nev. 1971).
But cf Belcher v. Nevada Rock & Sand Co., 516 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1975) (interpreting
Nevada law to hold a building contractor who follows the plans and specifications of the
owner to be absolved from strict liability notwithstanding the ruling in the Worrell case).
Non-designing manufacturers provide a service in a sense; they build something for a
buyer/designer that, for whatever reason, does not want to do it.
53. Moon, 287 N.W.2d at 434.
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specifications. 54 The Moon court insisted that the same rationale should
apply to the instant strict liability case involving a manufacturer.
In Moon, the plaintiff sued under a theory of strict liability. Recall
that by definition, strict liability does not depend on the fault, blameworthiness, or culpability of the defendant against whom it is to be
applied. 55 Once the court determined that defendant Winger Boss was
neither negligent nor at fault by virtue of complying with Iowa Beef's
faulty plans and specifications, the court presumably still should have
decided whether or not to apply strict liability. Instead, the Moon court
analyzed the strict liability claim in the same manner as the negligence
claim. 56 Thus, if the plaintiff was to recover from defendant Winger
Boss, the plaintiff would first have to show that the design that Iowa
Beef provided to Winger Boss was defective. Second, the plaintiff
would have to show that by following the design, Winger Boss failed to
act as a reasonable manufacturer that was similarly situated would
have-that a reasonable manufacturer would refuse to follow the design
because the design was unsafe, unsound, or unworkable. Although the
plaintiff demonstrated that the design was defective, the plaintiff was
unable to show that Winger Boss was at fault for following the
design. 57
C.

Analysis of The Nebraska Rule

The Moon court's holding is a departure from the traditional notion
behind strict liability--that victims of defective products will be
compensated without having to prove fault on the part of the defendant.
By requiring fault, the Nebraska Rule in effect rejects strict liability as

54. Id. Also, when a contractor/builder departs from the owner's plans and
specifications, without the owner's consent, the manufacturer is liable despite the
defective plans and specifications. In this situation the contractor proceeds at its own
risk. See Edward A. Hannan, Whose Design Is It? Sorting Out Liability In Construction
Cases, 60 DEF. CoUNs. J. 576, 578 (1993). The Moon court noted that Winger Boss
fully complied with all of Iowa Beefs specifications. Implicitly, Winger Boss was not
negligent in actually building the product. Moon, 287 N.W.2d at 432 ("There is no
evidence to support a finding of improper manufacture.").
55. See supra note I.
56. Moon, 287 N.W.2d at 432-33.
57. Id. at 434. The Moon court concluded that the trial court should have issued
a direct verdict on this issue. However, one Justice felt that there was a sufficient
question of fact as to whether Winger Boss recognized the defectiveness of Iowa Beefs
plans. Id. at 435 (Krivosha, C.J., concurring).
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a cause of action against a non-designing manufacturer in a design defect
case. The Moon court did not, however, fully explain the theory behind
the Nebraska Rule. Yet an analysis of the Moon court's holding yields
two underlying rationales of why strict liability was not imposed in this
instance.
First, in seeking the party responsible for a defective design, it is
illogical to look to a party who had no role in the design process. 58 If
a manufacturer complies with the terms of a contract entered into with
the buyer, it can be said that the buyer impliedly warrants that the plans
are adequate and sufficient. 59 The buyer has asked for a product to be
made in a certain way and has bargained for that product's design to be
as the buyer wants it; the manufacturer is contractually bound to follow
the buyer's design. 60 Hence, as the Moon case illustrates, in that
situation a manufacturer does not participate in the making of the
design. 61 The Nebraska Supreme Court was uncomfortable with
extending strict liability for a design defect to a party with absolutely no
connection to the designing process. As a result, a showing of fault was
made a prerequisite to liability.
Because the Nebraska Rule imposes this requirement of fault, a nondesigning manufacturer cannot be liable for a defective design itself.
Rather, a manufacturer can only be liable for following an unreasonable
design. 62 If the manufacturer is not at fault for following a defective
design, then the manufacturer is free from liability; a non-designing
manufacturer could not possibly be liable for the design itself if the
manufacturer had no role in the design process. 63 Whereas the

58. See id. at 434. A counter-argument is that strict liability is not concerned with
seeking out the party who is responsible for the design. A manufacturer is strictly liable
when the manufacturer simply produces a defective product that causes injury. See
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697
(1963).
59. See Hannan, supra note 54, at 577 ("In general, contractors are entitled to rely
on the accuracy of the contract documents.").
60. Viewed in this light, the manufacturer is providing a "service" for the
buyer--namely, performing a task that the buyer presumably does not have the time,
resources, or equipment to do itself. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 52, § 104A, at 72324; see also supra note 52.
61. See, e.g., Moon, 287 N.W.2d at 431-32.
62. Note that this requires an injured plaintiff to prove two elements. First, the
plaintiff must prove that a design was unreasonable, i.e., that it was defective. Second,
the plaintiff must prove that the manufacturer should not have followed it, i.e., that an
ordinary and reasonable manufacturer would not have followed the design. See supra
text accompanying notes 56-57.
63. Garrison v. Rohm & Haas Co., 492 F.2d 346 (6th Cir. 1974). In Garrison, a
plexiglass producer ordered the production of specialized dollies to transport boxes
containing sheets of plexiglass. The plexiglass producer designed the dollies and
supplied the manufacturer, Orangeville Co., with express plans and specifications. Id.
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manufacturer will not be held liable for the designs defectiveness, under
the Nebraska Rule liability attaches to the manufacturer that followed an
unreasonable design where an ordinary and reasonable manufacturer
would not have. In this latter scenario, actual fault is attributable to the
manufacturer because the manufacturer is responsible for its act of
following the design. This implies that the Nebraska Supreme Court felt
that although there are some instances where the non-designing
manufacturer should be held liable, it is indeed illogical to attach
liability for a design defect to a party that had no role in the design
process.
The second rationale underlying the Nebraska Rule is the idea that a
manufacturer of complex machinery should be treated in the same way
a builder or "handy-man" would be treated in any tort case where plans
and specifications are provided by an owner. To justify this rationale,
the Moon court relied on comment a of section 404 of the Second
Restatement of Torts. 64 As mentioned above, comment a states that a
builder enjoys virtual immunity when an owner provides the plans and

at 348. An employee of the plexiglass producer was injured by one of the dollies. The
injured plaintiff sued the employer and manufacturer, based on strict liability for a design
defect. The Sixth Circuit held that "even if there was a defective design ... the party
responsible was not Orangeville. Rohm and Haas was the designer, not Orangeville.
To hold Orangeville liable for [a] defective design would amount to holding a nondesigner liable for [a] design defect. Logic forbids any such result." Id. at 351.
The circuit court sought to apply the law of Kentucky, as the incident occurred in
Louisville, Kentucky; the faulty dollie was actually produced in Pennsylvania.
Jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(l)
(1983). The circuit court followed the rationale of the Kentucky Court of Appeal
regarding design defects: "(t]he distinction between the so-called strict liability principle
and negligence is of no practical significance so far as the standard of conduct required
of the defendant is concerned." Id. at 351 (quoting Jones v. Hutchinson Mfg., Inc., 502
S.W.2d 66, 69 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973)).
It is interesting to note, however, that if the circuit court had decided to rely on
Pennsylvania law, a similar result likely would have been reached. E.g., Lesnefsky v.
Fischer & Porter Co., Inc., 527 F. Supp. 951 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (holding that a manufacturer that complies with the plans and specifications of a third party would, under
Pennsylvania law, not be liable for design defects unless the manufacturer knew or
should have known the plans were unsafe); Orion Ins. Co., Ltd. v. United Tech. Corp.,
502 F. Supp. 173 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (non-designing manufacturer's liability in a design
defect case, under Pennsylvania law, is to be judged using a reasonableness standard
with respect to the manufacturer's conduct).
64. Moon v. Winger Boss, 287 N.W.2d 430,433 (Neb. 1980).
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specifications and the builder adheres to them. 65 Yet the standard
articulated in comment a pertains to negligence rather than strict liability
and it also contemplates an "independent contractor" or builder that
"makes, rebuilds or repairs a chattel for another," as opposed to a
manufacturer of complex machinery. 66 The extension of the rationale
of comment a to a non-designing manufacturer of machinery is,
however, equally appropriate.
Because the Nebraska Rule has a prerequisite of showing fault, the
reasoning of comment a, with respect to negligence, is applicable to the
Nebraska Rule's fault-based strict liability. Moreover, the comparison
of manufacturers to "builders" is also appropriate within this context.
A builder that follows an owner's plans is usually constructing a custommade product, such as a house. Because they are custom-made, products
that builders make using an owner's plans are neither mass-produced nor
widely distributed among the populace. 67 This is also the case when
a manufacturer conforms to a buyer's design-----the products are custom-

65. See supra notes 47-48, 52-53 and accompanying text; see also RESTATEMENT,
supra note 46, § 404 cmt. a. This rationale was articulated by the United States
Supreme Court. United States v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132 ( 1918). In Spearin, a contractor
agreed to build a dry-dock at the Brooklyn Naval Yard. The government had provided
the plans and specifications, which included instructions to divert an already existing sixfoot brick sewer. A heavy downpour of rain and a rising tide flooded the dry-dock after
breaking the diverted drainage system. Id. at 133-34. The Court asserted the general
rule: "[I]f [a] contractor is bound to build according to [the] plans and specifications
prepared by the owner, the contractor will not be responsible for the consequences of
defects in the plans and specifications." Id. at 136. But cf. Hannan, supra note 54, at 578
("[T]here is an exception when the contractor, without the owner's consent, departs from
the [owner's] plans and specifications, albeit the plans and specifications are defective.").
However, the cause of action in Spearin was not one in which a personal injury was
caused by a design defect. Rather, the contractor had refused to proceed with the
contract due to the government's refusal to pay for the additional costs incurred by the
flooding. The holding is an exception to the general rule that one who undertakes to
build something assumes the risk that unforeseen difficulties may make performance
more burdensome. Spearin, 248 U.S. at I 36. I have used this case only to illustrate the
traditional position a contractor/builder is in when an owner provides the plans and
specifications.
For a more general look at contract theories involving impossibility and frustration
between an owner and a contractor, see E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 9.6
(1990). For a particularly detailed analysis of the notions of implied warranties,
impossibility, and risk allocation in public contracts, see Steven L. Schooner,
Impossibility ofPerformance in Public Contracts: An Economic Analysis, 16 PUB. CONT.
L.J. 229 (1986).
66. RESTATEMENT, supra note 46, § 404 (1965). Also, comment a of that section,
which the court also relies on, contemplates a situation where the "owner" not only
provides plans and specifications, but also materials and supplies. Id. § 404 cmt. a.
67. See, e.g., Barnthouse v. California Steel Bldgs. Co., 215 Cal. App. 2d 72, 29
Cal Rptr. 835 (1963) (dealing with the construction of a grandstand); United States v.
Spearin, 248 U.S. 132 ( I 9 I 8) (dealing with the construction of a dry dock).
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made, not mass-produced. 68 Thus, a manufacturer in this context is just
like a builder.
Accordingly, the Nebraska Rule couples the negligence standard in
section 404 with the broader concept that a non-designing manufacturer,
like a builder, is not liable for defects in the plans and specifications it
is given by an owner. In asserting that a manufacturer is analogous to
a builder, the Nebraska Rule absolves the non-designing manufacturer
from liability when a buyer's design is defective. Thus, when a nondesigning manufacturer follows a buyer's plans and specifications, the
manufacturer can only be liable under a fault standard, wherein the plans
and specifications are such that an ordinary and reasonable manufacturer
would refuse to follow them.
Ultimately, under the Nebraska Rule, traditional strict liability will not
be applied to a non-designing manufacturer in a design defect case that
is based on the design itself. 69 The Nebraska Rule has a prerequisite
of finding fault before liability will be applied to a non-designing
manufacturer in a design case, regardless of whether the action is
brought in negligence or strict liability. To recover from a nondesigning manufacturer for a design defect, an injured plaintiff must
fulfill the burden of proving not only that a particular design was
68. See, e.g., Moon v. Winger Boss, 287 N.W.2d 430 (Neb. 1980) (dealing with
an automated conveyor system); Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Corp., 451 A.2d
179 (N.J. 1982) (dealing with a unique transformer press); see also Garrison v. Rohm
& Hass Co., 492 F.2d 346 (6th Cir. 1974) (dealing witb dollies for transporting sheets
of plexiglass).
69. See Moon, 287 N.W.2d at 434. Recall that traditional strict liability is liability
without fault. See supra note 1. Under the Nebraska Rule, strict liability is the legal
taxonomy in which the suit is brought. Strict liability, in the traditional sense ofliability
without fault, is not applied under the Nebraska Rule. Rather, strict liability under the
Nebraska Rule is based on fault. Thus, although the Moon court referred to strict
liability, it was not traditional strict liability. Moreover, with respect to traditional strict
liability, both courts and commentators have recognized that the burden of proof in strict
liability cases resembles a negligence standard. Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test
for Design Defect: From Negligence {to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33
VAND. L. REV. 593, 647-49 (1980) ("[A] questionable assumption courts have relied on
in applying strict liability in design defect cases is that since [strict liability] will not
require proof of negligence, the conclusion derived cannot be cast in terms of
negligence."); Elizabeth C. Price, Toward a Unified Theory of Products Liability:
Reviving the Causative Concept of Legal Fault, 61 TENN. L. REv. 1277, 1297 (1994)
(noting negligence factors in strict liability); Anita Bernstein, How Can A Product Be
Liable?, 45 DUKE L.J. I, 11-12, 13 n.39 (1995) ("Abolishing products liability and
replacing it with negligence would offer a speedy remedy for various ailments within the
current system."); see also infra notes 206-08 and accompanying text.
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defective, but also that the manufacturer was negligent in following the
design. In essence, an injured plaintiff will have to show fault on the
part of a non-designing manufacturer if the plaintiff is to succeed on a
strict liability claim against the manufacturer.

IV.

THE NEW JERSEY RULE

The New Jersey Supreme Court has also addressed the issue of
whether a manufacturer that complies with the plans and specifications
of a non-governmental buyer can be held strictly liable for design
defects. Contrary to the Nebraska Rule's requirement of proving fault
on the part of a non-designing manufacturer, the New Jersey Supreme
Court embraced the notion that such a manufacturer is strictly liable in
Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Corp. 70 The court asserted that a
non-designing manufacturer need not be at fault for the design itself nor
for compliance with an unreasonable design in order to be held strictly
liable for a design defect. In determining liability, it is irrelevant
whether the manufacturer was in any way responsible for the drafting of
the design. Likewise, it is equally irrelevant whether the manufacturer
was reasonable in following the plans and specifications. 71 In essence,
under the New Jersey Rule, if the design is found to be defective, the
manufacturer is strictly liable, even if the manufacturer was required to
follow a buyer's plans and specifications as a matter of contractual
obligation. 72

70. 451 A.2d 179 (N.J. 1982).
7 I. Recall from the previous discussion of the Nebraska Rule that a distinguishing
characteristic of the Nebraska Rule was that a non-designing manufacturer would be held
strictly liable for a design defect if the design and specifications are so obviously
dangerous that a reasonable manufacturer that is similarly situated would not comply
with them. Moon, 287 N.W.2d at 434. Thus, unreasonable or careless compliance with
a defective design was the exception to the Nebraska Rule that would yield strict liability
for a non-designing manufacturer in a design defect case.
Conversely, the New Jersey Rule, discussed here, is not concerned with whether or not
the manufacturer was justified in complying with a buyer's plans and specifications. See
generally Micha/ko, 451 A.2d at 179, 183-84. Theoretically, even if every manufacturer
that is similarly situated would have followed the buyer's plans and specifications, and
even if the plans and specifications are unquestionably sound on their face, if they are
subsequently shown to be defective, the manufacturer will be held strictly liable if named
as a defendant. When juxtaposed in this light with the Nebraska Rule, it becomes
increasingly apparent just how much more comprehensive and ubiquitous the strict
liability coverage is under the New Jersey Rule.
72. As discussed infra, the defendants in the Micha/ko case were required by the
contract with plaintiff's employer, Elastimold, to follow Elastimold's plans and
specifications. In an attempt to remove itself from strict liability under New Jersey law,
the defendant alleged that it was merely following its duty under the contract. Michalko,
451 A.2d at 183. However, the court bluntly rejected this contention. Id.; see also infra
notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
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A.

The Facts

In Michalko, the plaintiff was an employee of Elastimold. She was
the operator of a thirty-five ton, vertical transformer press, which
soldered wires to cable transformers in a mold cavity. 73 Sometimes,
rubber strips from the press would fall out during the process, in which
case the plaintiff had been instructed by her employer to hold them in
the mold cavity with her left hand while she used her right hand to
operate the press control panel. 74 The plaintiff followed these instructions, and as a result, her left hand was amputated when it got stuck
between the mold and the cavity in the press. The press did not have
any safety devices that would have prevented the plaintiff's injury. 75
Elastimold's parent company built the transformer press that injured
the plaintiff. However, Cubby Manufacturing Company (Cubby) rebuilt
the press prior to the incident. Cubby's contract with Elastimold
required that Cubby follow Elastimold's drawings and specifications.76
Cubby knew that safety devices could be installed, yet adhered to the
specific design supplied by Elastimold. 77 Therefore, the final product

73. Micha/ko, 451 A.2d at I 8 I.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. The court below had determined that it was Cubby's policy not to question the
absence of safety guards when it was not building a complete machine. Id. Cubby's
policy comported with the Second Restatement's view that a manufacturer need not "sit
in judgment" on a buyer's plans. RESTATEMENT, supra note 46, § 404 cmt. a. The
safety devices used on this type of press varied according to the purposes for which the
press was used. See Michalko, 451 A.2d at 182 n. l. Thus, even if Cubby had "sat in
judgment" on Elastimold's plans and installed a safety device, it may not have selected
the most appropriate safety device.
77. Micha/ko, 451 A.2d at 181-82. This is particularly relevant because Elastimold
originally built the press and Elastimold had a superior knowledge of not only the
transformer press's use in production, but also of the intricacies of the press's design,
including the need for a safety device. Elastimold failed to provide an adequate design.
Yet the court noted that Cubby had performed several jobs for Elastimold during the
1960's and had, as a result, acquired a "knowledge" of the type of work that the
transformer presses performed in the manufacturing process. Id.
In Moon, the court acknowledged that the defendant manufacturer was denied access
to the buyer's plant and was not permitted to inspect the details of the overall system
into which the product would be incorporated. Moon v. Winger Boss, 287 N.W.2d 430,
434 (Neb. 1980). Implicitly, the Moon court recognized that the manufacturer was in
a position of lesser knowledge. See id. This enhanced a finding that, under the rule
announced, the manufacturer was not at fault for following the buyer's design.
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was manufactured according to Elastimold's design, which did not
provide for any type of safety device.
Plaintiff brought suit against Cubby, based on negligence, breach of
express and implied warranties, and strict liability. 78 The trial court
held that defendant Cubby could not be held strictly liable because
Cubby produced the press according to Elastimold's exact specifications
and Cubby was not the designer. 79 The trial court dismissed the action

However, if the manufacturer had possessed a greater knowledge, that would have
increased the persuasiveness of an argument that the manufacturer should have known
that the plans were defective.
By contrast, the Michalko court quickly dismissed the contention that defendant Cubby
was, like the defendant in Moon, in a position of "lesser knowledge." The reason was
Cubby's past work for Elastimold. Michalko, 451 A.2d at 181-82. Thus, Cubby was
in a position to know that Elastimold's design should have had an appropriate safety
device, yet Cubby nonetheless followed the design. It is peculiar that the Michalko court
made this point. Unlike the Nebraska Rule, the New Jersey Rule is not at all dependent
on fault; at least not superficially. See infra text accompanying note 88. Yet one can
infer that the court is answering the Nebraska Rule, as if to say that Cubby should have
recognized the defectiveness of Elastimold's design and thus, is at fault.
78. Plaintiff initially sued Cubby, the party who re-built and manufactured the
product that caused plaintiff's injury, and Square D Co., the manufacturer of the control
panel that was part of the machine. Ultimately, the plaintiff only maintained the action
against Cubby. Plaintiff alleged breach of warranty, negligence, and strict liability
claims. Michalko, 451 A.2d at 182.
79. The trial court also based its holding in part on the fact that there was not a
"sale" under the traditional definition. Furthermore, the trial court reasoned that Cubby
was not susceptible to New Jersey notions of strict liability, even though Cubby had
installed additional hydraulic systems to the presses, because its work did not constitute
a "substantial change" in the product. The trial court also held that "an independent
contractor has no duty to warn a knowledgeable buyer that a machine is dangerously
designed." Id. at 182 (emphasis added). Finally, the trial court found that it was
"impractical to install a safety device since different uses of the machine required
different devices." Id. An analysis of this final point is in order.
This last point made by the trial court seems to be the equivalent of saying that
defendant Cubby was reasonable in not installing or recommending a safety device
because to do so would be inappropriate; it would be unlikely that the most appropriate
safety device would have been selected. See supra note 76. As a result, the trial court
refused to hold Cubby strictly liable. The trial court appears to follow the Nebraska
Rule's requirement of finding fault on the part of a non-designing manufacturer before
strict liability is applied.
Recall from the discussion of the Michalko facts that Cubby was fully aware that
safety devices should be installed on the presses. This indicates that Cubby, under the
Nebraska Rule, may have proceeded to follow plans and specifications where an ordinary
and reasonable manufacturer would not have. See supra text accompanying note 50.
However, under the trial court's reasoning, it was inappropriate to install safety devices
because "different uses of the [press] required different devices." Michalko, 451 A.2d
at 182. Thus, if the installation was inappropriate, Cubby surely was justified in
following Elastimold's instructions to omit them. Hence, Cubby would not be at fault
and consequently, not subject to strict liability.
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against Cubby with prejudice. On appeal the decision was affirmed.

B.

The New Jersey Supreme Courts Holding

The New Jersey Supreme Court framed the issue as "whether an
independent contractor that undertakes to rebuild part of a machine in
accordance with the specifications of the owner has a legal duty to
foreseeable users of the machine to make the machine safe or to warn
of the dangers inherent in its use."80 In order to render a final judgment on this issue, the court first faced the task of determining whether
a design defect existed. 81 The transformer press had a defective design
because the original design, drafted by Elastimold, omitted any
specifications regarding a safety device. The absence of a safety device

However, Cubby had a history of manufacturing transactions with Elastimold. See
Michalko, 451 A.2d at 18 I. Cubby did in fact know the purposes to which Elastimold
would put the press. Arguably, Cubby knew, or should have known, not only that the
press design required a safety device, but also which device would be appropriate. This
would constitute the requisite fault under the Nebraska Rule and hence, evoke the
application of strict liability against Cubby. See supra text accompanying note 50. It
is unclear whether the trial court considered this in making the decision not to hold
Cubby strictly liable.
The New Jersey Supreme Court did not concern itself with whether Cubby was at
fault. The court applied traditional strict liability: liability regardless of fault. However,
the court did mention Cubby's implicit knowledge that a particular safety device should
have been installed. See infra note 87 and accompanying text. See generally Thomas E.
Powell, II, Products Liability and Optional Safety Equipment-Who Knows More?, 73
NEB. L. REv. 843, 865-69 (1994) (discussing the problem of assigning liability for the
omission of safety devices).
80. Michalko, 451 A.2d at I 82.
8 I. See id. at 182. The court used the following rule to establish the fact that the
transformer press had a defective design:
The elements of a prima facie case of strict liability for design defects [in New
Jersey] are proof that (I) the product design was defective; (2) the defect
existed when the product was distributed by and under the control of [the]
defendant; and (3) the defect caused injury to a reasonably foreseeable user.
Id. at I 83. Under the first element, the product lacked a safety device and thus, had a
defective design. Clearly, this lack of a safety device existed when Cubby returned the
transformer press to Elastimold, thus satisfying the second element. Implicitly, the
defect's existence lasted from the inception of the product because the actual design did
not include safety devices. The third element was satisfied when plaintiff sustained the
injury while operating the press. Plaintiff was an employee of Elastimold and thus, was
a foreseeable user of the transformer press. For a criticism of the design defect test used
by New Jersey state courts prior to the time Michalko was decided, see Lawrence H.
Haber, Note, The Design Defect Test in New Jersey: An Unworkable Standard, I 0
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1297 (1982).
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made the press unsafe and imposed a duty to warn on Cubby. 82
Despite the fact that the transformer press design was defective, and
as a result caused injury to the plaintiff, the Michalko court still inquired
into whether Cubby could be held strictly liable for the design as a nondesigning manufacturer. Elastimold, plaintiff's employer, not only built
the machine, but also instructed plaintiff to operate the machine in the
manner that ultimately resulted in a serious injury. Furthermore,
Elastimold gave Cubby specific instructions to follow the plans and
specifications supplied by Elastimold.
Nevertheless, following a traditional theory of strict liability, the court
noted that "[u]nder New Jersey law, manufacturers ... are strictly liable
for damages caused by defectively designed products," 83 whether or not
the manufacturers are at fault for the defect. The court first stated that
the actual product is the focus in determining whether to hold a
manufacturer strictly liable. 84 Next, the court held that if the risk of
injury from a dangerous defect is greater than the overall social utility
of the product, then a manufacturer will be held strictly liable for any
injuries resulting from a design defect. Yet this holding actually
resembles a fault standard; it blames a manufacturer for creating a
risk. 85
82. The supreme court disagreed with the trial court, in that the supreme court held
that any duty to warn on the part of Cubby was owed to a foreseeable user and not to
the designing buyer Elastimold. Michal/co, 451 A.2d at 187.
83. Id. at 182.
84. Id. at 183.
85. Id. Indeed, notice the similarity of this quantitative relationship in determining
whether strict liability applies and Judge Learned Hand's classic algebraic equation for
determining an unreasonable risk. In Michal/co, if the risk of injury outweighs social
utility, then a party will be held strictly liable for a defect. Id. A court theoretically
could find that the risk of injury is so remote and the social utility is so high that strict
liability would not apply to redress an injury. Yet this is unlikely.
In the terms expressed by the Michalko court, however, it appears as if the court
envisioned a high risk as being synonymous with fault; a manufacturer fails to exercise
due care if it creates a high risk. Put another way, a manufacturer is at fault for creating
a high risk and thus, held strictly liable. Similarly, Judge Hand's test for determining
whether a party failed to exercise due care by creating unreasonable risk is as follows:
A party is liable if the burden to the party in preventing the risk (B) is outweighed by
the gravity of the resulting injury (L) and the probability an injury would result (P).
United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). The equation is B
< PL. Id. Judge Hand's test determines fault.
Both the Hand test and the Michal/co court's test seek to balance competing concerns.
In the Hand test, an unreasonable risk is the equivalent of fault and thus, a lack of due
care. Where the risk is great and an injury results, liability is imposed. Likewise, under
the Michalko court's test, the presence of a great risk invokes the application of strict
liability. Strict liability is applied for creating a high risk of injury. This is the virtual
equivalent of saying that a party is at fault for creating the risk. See RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LA w I 65 (3d ed. I 986) ("[T]he term strict liability
is something of a misnomer ... because in deciding whether a product is defective or
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The court concluded that the principles of strict liability apply equally
to manufacturers who rebuild machines and manufacturers who make
component parts, just as those principles apply to manufacturers who
produce new products. 86 Although a finding of fault is unnecessary in
the application of strict liability, the court stated that when it is feasible
for a manufacturer to affirmatively incorporate safety devices and it fails
to install them, the manufacturer is deemed to have delivered a defective
product. 87 Thus, Cubby was held strictly liable. The court espoused
the New Jersey Rule in the following terms:
[T]he fact that [a] product was built according to the plans and specifications
of[an] owner [or buyer] does not constitute a defense to a claim based on strict
liability for the manufacture of a defective product when the injuries are
suffered by an innocent foreseeable user of the product. 88

The court rejected Cubby's argument that, under the contract with
Elastimold, it had no option but to comply with Elastimold's design.
Under this rule, it was also irrelevant that Cubby had no role in the
product's design. Likewise, it was not necessary for Cubby to have
created the defect in order to hold Cubby strictly liable. 89 Nor was it
necessary that Cubby even knew of the defect. 90 The relevant factor
was only that the design itself was defective. 91 Under the New Jersey
Rule, a manufacturer's "adherence to or reliance upon the owner's plans,
even though required by its contract, is ... irrelevant."92

unreasonably dangerous in design ... the courts often use a Hand Formula approach .

. . .").

86. Michalko, 451 A.2d at 183.
87. Id. It is a virtually inescapable inference that the court in this respect again
seems to be charging the manufacturer with fault. If a manufacturer should have
installed a safety device, but did not, the manufacturer is culpable: it is at fault for
delivering a defective product. Indeed, the New Jersey Rule's strict liability standards
are extremely similar to negligence standards. See id.; see also sources cited supra note
69.
88. Michalko, 451 A.2d at 183.
89. Id. at 183-84.
90. Cf supra note 77 (indicating that the Michalko court implied that Cubby was
at fault for the design defect because Cubby should have known the design was
defective).
91. Michalko, 451 A.2d at 183-84; see also Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach.
Co., 406 A.2d 140 (N.J. 1979) (holding that if a defect exists while a manufacturer is
in "control" of the product, that is sufficient to hold the manufacturer liable for the
defect).
92. Michalko, 451 A.2d at 183-84.
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C.

Analysis of The New Jersey Rule

The New Jersey Rule is pure strict liability. Regardless of fault, and
regardless of the fact that a non-designing manufacturer was obligated
by contract to comply with a buyer's plans and specifications, a nondesigning manufacturer may be held strictly liable if the design is later
proved to be defective. The Michalko court's holding is in accordance
with the Second Restatement of Torts section 402A. 93 Section 402A
purports to hold manufacturers liable for defective products even if due
care was exercised.
In New Jersey, the focus of strict liability is on the product. 94
Knowledge of any hidden or unforeseen defects in the product, including
design defects, are imputed to the manufacturer. "The imputation of
knowledge is, of course, a legal fiction. It is another way of saying that
for purposes of strict liability the defendant's knowledge of the [defect]
is irrelevant."95 Hence, even if an ordinary and reasonable manufacturer that is similarly situated would have followed a buyer's design, a nondesigning manufacturer is strictly liable for any resulting design defects
in the product that caused an injury. 96 Also, strict liability applies even

93. The oft-quoted § 402A reads as follows:
(I) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to
his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule in Subsection (I) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 46, § 402A. But cf. RESTATEMENT (TmRD) OF TORTS:
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b), at 9 (Tentative Draft No. I, 1994) [hereinafter THIRD
RESTATEMENT]. The proposed Third Restatement incorporates a negligence-type standard
in design defect cases. Section 2(b), which sets the standard of liability for design
defects, "achieve[s] the same general objectives as does liability predicated on
negligence." THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra, § 2(b) cmt. a, at 12.
94. Cf. Moon v. Winger Boss Co., Inc., 287 N.W.2d 430 (Neb. 1980) (focusing
on the manufacturer's act of following a design).
95. Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 544 n.3 (N.J. 1982).
96. This notion had been previously articulated by a United States District Court.
Lenherr v. NRM Corp., 504 F. Supp. 165 (D. Kan. 1980). In Lenherr, plaintiff was an
employee of Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company. Plaintiff was the operator of a
squeegee machine, which was used to make bands for tires. The machines had been
built by NRM, according to the detailed design of Goodyear. Id. at 174. The design did
not include safety devices. Plaintiff got his arm caught between two rollers of the
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when a non-designing manufacturer has exercised the highest possible
standard of due care in the production process. 97
The New Jersey Rule rejects the rationale of the Second Restatement
of Torts section 404 that a "construction-type" contractor or builder is
not liable for the consequences that flow from the plans and specifications provided by the owner. Thus, a contractor, such as Cubby, is
required to "sit in judgment" on the plans and specifications of an owner
before competing for a bid from that owner. 98 In this sense, the New
Jersey Rule is a classic example of section 402A. Under section 402A,
if the product is deemed "unreasonably dangerous" by virtue of a defect,
then the manufacturer may be held strictly liable. 99 This is the essence
of the New Jersey Rule. 100
V.

A COMPARISON OF THE NEBRASKA AND NEW JERSEY RULES

A comparison of the Nebraska and New Jersey Rules sets the stage for
determining the approach the California Supreme Court should take in
deciding whether or not to hold a non-designing manufacturer strictly
liable for a design defect. This comparison will reveal the dynamics of
each rule. Accordingly, the comparison will be used in the next section
of this Comment to show how each rule comports with the recent trend
of the California Supreme Court.
Under the Nebraska Rule, the imposition of strict liability on a nondesigning manufacturer for a design defect is justified based on the fact

squeegee machine. Plaintiff's arm was amputated. Plaintiff sued NRM alleging strict
liability for a design defect. The Lenherr court held for the plaintiff, relying on § 402A
of the Second Restatement of Torts. "[A]nyone who sells a product in a defective
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user is liable for physical harm to the user
caused by such condition .... Under this rule [manufacturers] are held liable for
[design] defects which they have not caused." Id. Knowledge of the design's
defectiveness is imputed to the manufacturer, making actual knowledge of the defect
irrelevant. See id. As the Micha/ko court put it, "[s]ince a strict liability standard
applies, it is not necessary for plaintiff to show that the manufacturer knew or had reason
to know that the product was unreasonably dangerous." Michalko, 451 A.2d at 187. But
cf supra note 77.
97. RESTATEMENT, supra note 46, § 402A cmt. a.
98. But see supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
99. RESTATEMENT, supra note 46, § 402A cmt. j. "Where warning is given, the
seller may reasonably assume that it will be read and heeded; and a product bearing such
a warning, which is safe for use if it is followed, is not in defective condition, nor is it
unreasonably dangerous." Id.
I 00. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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that the manufacturer was at fault. By contrast, the New Jersey Rule
attaches strict liability to a non-designing manufacturer regardless of
fault. Thus, the New Jersey Rule is based on traditional strict liability
theory. Traditional strict liability does not require proof of fault as a
precursor to imposing liability. Consequently, holding a party strictly
liability is not justified on the grounds that the party is culpable.
Instead, traditional strict liability theory offers public policy justifications
to warrant the imposition of liability on an otherwise blameless party.
In explicating and advocating the New Jersey Rule announced in
Michalko, one commentator articulated these public policy justifications
as a three-part rationale. 101 They are the same three general justifications advanced by virtually all proponents of strict liability: deterrence,
enterprise liability, and victim compensation. 102 Whereas these public
policy concerns serve as justifications for strict liability under the New
Jersey Rule, both the Nebraska and New Jersey Rules fulfill these goals,
albeit in different ways and with distinct ramifications.

A.

Deterrence

The first policy behind strict liability is to deter manufacturers from
producing defective products. Imposing strict liability on a nondesigning manufacturer for a design defect serves as a deterrent by
"giving manufacturers the incentive to [prevent] defective products from
entering the marketplace." 103 Indeed, under the New Jersey Rule, the
ominous threat of strict liability would induce a non-designing manufacturer to actively ensure that it does not produce a defective product. In
the face of potential strict liability, non-designing manufacturers would
be compelled to carefully scrutinize a buyer's plans and specifications
before following them. This in tum would effectuate the policy of
deterrence: if plans and specifications are more thoroughly scrutinized
by manufacturers, fewer defective products will be manufactured.
However, the New Jersey Rule goes too far in this respect. Although
the New Jersey Rule may induce a non-designing manufacturer to take
every precaution before following a buyer's design, many design defects

10 I. Jacqueline Shubatt, Products Liability-Application of Strict Liability to the
Independent Contractor Who Conforms to the Plans and Specifications of a NonGovernmental Purchaser: Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Corp., 9 J. CORP. L. 113,
121-25 (1983).
I 02. See, e.g., John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products,
44 MISS. L.J. 825, 826 (1973); James, supra note 8, at 923, 925; Mary J. Davis, Design
Defect Liability: In Search of a Standard of Responsibility, 39 WAYNE L. REV. 1217
(1993); see also Shubatt, supra note 101, at 121-25.
103. Shubatt, supra note IOI, at 121.
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are often impossible to forecast, particularly when a buyer's design
initially appears to be technologically sound. Under the New Jersey
Rule, even if a non-designing manufacturer exercises every precaution
before following a buyer's design, the manufacturer will nevertheless be
held strictly liable for any design defects if the product causes an injury.
This holds true even though the defects may not have been foreseeable.
Yet once the manufacturer has taken every precaution, the New Jersey
Rule's punitive nature becomes extraneous and ineffective; all deterrence
value is lost at this point. The result is that beyond inducing a nondesigning manufacturer to exercise due care in following a buyer's
specifications, the New Jersey Rule inequitably 104 punishes a manufacturer for unforeseeable defects. 105 From a practical business standpoint, a manufacturer, in the face of the New Jersey Rule, will be
compelled to stifle business with customers who want custom-made
products, such as farm equipment, assembly-line machinery, and the like.
This would occur out of fear of unforeseen defects with the customer's
design, which are often deemed defective as a matter of law rather than
as a matter of the "law of mechanics."
The Nebraska Rule better approximates the goal of deterrence. Like
the New Jersey Rule, it compels a non-designing manufacturer to take
all reasonable precautions in following a buyer's specifications. If the
I 04. Throughout the remainder of this Comment, I will use variations of the word
equity as an adjective. As a term, "equity has come to be employed with various special
significations." I JOHN N. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE§ 44 (Spencer w. Symons
ed., 5th ed. 1994). I am using the term to denote fairness------a fundamental fairness that
stands for justice. Indeed,
[i]t is in this sense that the epithet 'equitable' is constantly used, even at
present day, by judges and text-writers, in order to describe certain doctrines
and rules which, it is supposed, will tend to promote justice and right in the
relations of mankind, or between the litigant parties in a particular case.
Id. § 45. Of course, other meanings have been ascribed to the term. Id. §§ 44-45. But
equity as denoting fairness is most widely recognized. See id. § 45; see also BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 540 (6th ed. 1990) (Equity is "[j]ustice ... according to fairness .
. . ."); I DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES§ 2.1(3)(2d ed. 1993) ("One group of ideas
associated with the term equity suggests fairness and moral quality.").
105. Put another way, the deterrence value of the New Jersey Rule is effective only
insofar as it compels a non-designing manufacturer to exercise the utmost precaution
before following a buyer's design. After that point, the New Jersey Rule attempts to
deter manufacturers for things beyond their control, such as unforeseeable defects or
defects found by a court to exist as a matter of law; these are un-deterrable instances.
See generally Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does
Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377 (1994) (questioning the levels of
deterrence behind economic theories of tort law).
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manufacturer is unreasonable in following the buyer's design, the
manufacturer will be held liable. This compels a manufacturer to
carefully scrutinize a buyer's design before following it. However, the
Nebraska Rule avoids the inequitable results inherent in the New Jersey
Rule. Whereas the New Jersey Rule punishes a non-designing manufacturer for deficiencies in a design that the manufacturer could neither
predict nor control, the Nebraska Rule effectuates the goal of deterrence
through the threat of liability up until the point where deterrence is no
longer feasible. In other words, if a non-designing manufacturer
exercises every reasonable precaution before following a buyer's design,
the manufacturer has done all it can to prevent a defective product from
entering the marketplace; there is nothing left to deter. 106 The Nebraska rule purports to hold liable those manufacturers who, in the name of
profit or sheer ignorance (or both), attempt to carry out unsound plans
and specifications. 107 This potential liability will deter blind or
uninformed adherence to unreasonable plans and thus, strive to quell
defective products from entering the market. Therefore, the Nebraska
Rule's deterrence value is superior to the New Jersey Rule's superfluous
deterrence efforts.

B.

Enterprise Liability

The second justification for imposing strict liability for design defects
on a non-designing manufacturer is enterprise liability: "that the costs of
injuries resulting from defective products be borne by those who placed
the products on the market, rather than by the injured persons who
generally are unable to protect themselves from the dangers of the
product." 108 The New Jersey Rule fulfills this objective by placing the

106. I have referred to the manufacturer taking precautions before following a
buyer's design. Of course, if at any stage during the manufacturing of a product it
becomes (or should have become) apparent to the manufacturer that the buyer's design
is defective, the manufacturer would face liability under the Nebraska Rule. See Moon
v. Winger Boss Co., Inc., 287 N.W.2d 430, 433-34 (Neb. 1980).
107. See id. at 434.
108. Shubatt, supra note 101, at 122 (citing Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc.,
377 P.2d 897 (1963)). "The goal [of enterprise liability] has been to hold business
enterprises responsible for losses resulting from their activities so that they will have
appropriate incentives to reduce risk and will provide victims with needed insurance
against losses." VIRGINIA E. NOLAN & EDMUND URSIN, UNDERSTANDING ENTERPRISE
LIABILITY: RETIIINKING TORT REFORM FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 3-4 (1995)
(footnote omitted).
Enterprise liability, in this respect, does not refer to the concept wherein an entire
industry is rendered liable for the action of one manufacturer whose identity cannot be
unequivocally established. This particular notion of "enterprise liability" is frequently
referred to in cases involving prescription drugs. E.g., Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 26 Cal.
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cost of an injury from a design defect on a non-designing manufacturer.
The policy of enterprise liability is consistently effectuated under the
New Jersey Rule because non-designing manufacturers are held liable for
design defects regardless of fault. This ensures that whenever a design
defect causes injury, the cost of injury will not be borne by the victim.
Rather, the cost of injury in every case will be borne by a manufacturer.
Holding a manufacturer liable based on enterprise liability is justified
under three subsections of enterprise liability: public reliance, benefits
from business, and risk spreading. Although each subsection will be
discussed separately, they are not mutually exclusive.

1.

Public Reliance

Enterprise liability, as a policy justification for strict liability, is often
based on the fact that because the public must rely on a manufacturer's
superior knowledge, the manufacturer should compensate the public for
injuries. Proponents of the New Jersey Rule find this support for the
concept of enterprise liability in the Second Restatement of Torts section
402A comment c. 109 Comment c unequivocally articulates the concept
that the cost of injuries from defective products should be placed upon
a party in the manufacturing or distributing process. Comment c
justifies this notion by the fact that "the public ... is forced to rely upon
the seller." 110 In other words, the consuming public is unable to

3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
109. Shubatt, supra note IOI, at 122. The rationale of comment c has been further
utilized to justify the application of strict liability upon other parties in the chain of
distribution. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text; Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal.
3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. I 78 (1970) (holding that parties other than
manufacturers can be held strictly liable under an enterprise liability rationale); accord
RESTATEMENT, supra note 46, § 402A cmt. f ("[Strict liability] applies to any
manufacturer of such a [defective] product, [and] to any wholesale or retail dealer or
distributor.... ").
Comment c of § 402A explains the rationale of enterprise liability:
[T]he justification for the strict liability has been said to be that the selJer, by
marketing his product for use and consumption, has undertaken and assumed
a special responsibility toward any member of the consuming public who may
be injured by it ... and that the consumer of such products is entitled to the
maximum of protection at the hands of someone, and the proper persons to
afford it are those who market the products.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 46, § 402A cmt. c; see also 1 SHAPO, supra note 38, 'I]
7.05(1)-(3) (evaluating the rationale of comment c).
I IO. RESTATEMENT, supra note 46, § 402A cmt. C.
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protect itself from defective products because it is forced to rely upon
parties, such as a manufacturer, that possess superior knowledge and
control over the products they produce. This assumption of reliance is
not, however, applicable in the context of a non-designing manufacturer
that conforms to the specifications of a buyer. When a buyer insists that
a manufacturer follows the buyer's own design, the buyer is not relying
on the manufacturer to produce a design. Insofar as the product is
concerned, it is the buyer that possesses superior knowledge-the buyer
is the designer. Nevertheless, this justification of a non-designing
manufacturer's superior knowledge is offered in support of the New
Jersey Rule. 111
Even if the buyer possesses superior knowledge with respect to the
non-designing manufacturer, the non-designing manufacturer still has
superior knowledge compared to the public. This becomes the argument
behind the New Jersey Rule. But there are two problems with this
argument. First, a non-designing manufacturer does not deal with the
public; its customer is the buyer/designer. Beyond this, a second, more
fundamental difficulty with the "superior knowledge" argument is that
injuries caused by a faulty design intuitively result from an insufficient
designing process, from which a non-designing manufacturer is excluded.
The resulting product is dangerous, but it is dangerous due to its design.
In merely following a design, pursuant to contractual obligations, a
non-designing manufacturer is in a superior position to the public
regarding knowledge and control of the product's design only insofar as
any defects in the design are detectable. Put another way, the concept
of the public being forced to rely on a non-designing manufacturer is
misguided because it assumes that a non-designing manufacturer has a
greater knowledge of unforeseeable defects than the manufacturer
actually has. If a design is technologically sound at the outset of
production, it cannot be said that the public must rely on a nondesigning manufacturer because the manufacturer does not have any
superior knowledge of unforeseeable design defects.
The Nebraska Rule, by contrast, fulfills the notion of enterprise
liability by imposing a duty upon a non-designing manufacturer to carry
out only those designs that are not detectably defective. In cases where
a non-designing manufacturer has not acted responsibly-where there is
fault--the goal of enterprise liability is accomplished because the
manufacturer will be held liable if sued by the victims. Unlike the New
Jersey Rule, the Nebraska Rule recognizes the fact that it is inaccurate
to justify a broader sense of enterprise liability on notions of forced

111.
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public reliance in situations where it is impossible for any party to
expect that a design will later be deemed defective.
2.

Benefits from Business

Enterprise liability is also used to justify strict liability under the
"benefits from business" theory. Under the benefits theory, it is believed
that a party should be made to compensate the public for injuries caused
by defects because the party benefits from selling to the public. This
corollary of enterprise liability is centered on the notion of deriving
benefits from the public. Proponents of the New Jersey Rule adopt the
idea that a non-designing manufacturer that makes a custom product
gains benefits from the sale and thus, should be held liable for its
defects. 112 The manufacturer's lack of connection with the source of
defectiveness is irrelevant. 113

112. Shubatt, supra note 101, at 122; see also Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods.,
Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963) (articulating the notion that
a manufacturer that places a product on the market can be held liable for any injuries
it causes due to defectiveness of the product); Roger J. Traynor, Ways and Meanings of
Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363, 365-66 (1965) (explaining
that strict liability will not apply to a manufacturer "for injuries from the use of nondefective products.").
113. In the context of a non-designing manufacturer that follows a buyer's design,
the argument is that because retailers can be held strictly liable, so too should nondesigning manufacturers, as they are part of the marketing enterprise. See Shubatt, supra
note IO I, at I 22. Retailers, like non-designing manufacturers, presumably have no
connection with a product's design, but are still held liable for design defects. See supra
note 19 and accompanying text. This argument seems to comport with comment f to
§ 402A, which holds that strict liability "applies to any [partyJ engaged in the business
of selling products." RESTATEMENT, supra note 46, § 402A cmt. f (emphasis added).
Although the comments to § 402A do not explicitly mention non-designing manufacturers, the reasoning expressed by comment f seems easily applicable to non-designing
manufacturers. Id. (expressing that other parties in the chain of distribution are
susceptible to strict liability).
This analogy between retailers and non-designing manufacturers is not, however,
without flaws. The benefit a retailer receives from distributing or selling a product
comes directly from the consumer. "Retailers . . . are engaged in the business of
distributing goods to the public." Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 259,
391 P.2d 168, 171, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 899 (1964). Conversely, a non-designing
manufacturer derives its economic gain from the designer/buyer, who is the ultimate
consumer. In other words, non-designing manufacturers do not benefit from the
consuming public in the same way that retailers do. Rather, any benefits derived from
the consuming public are indirect.
Furthermore, non-designing manufacturers, when compared with retailers, engage in
a significantly lower amount of sales transactions. Whereas retailers make their entire
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The benefits theory is an inappropriate justification for the New Jersey
Rule. When a manufacturer makes a product for a buyer, using the
buyer's design, it is not selling to the public, it is selling a custom
product to a specialized buyer. Nevertheless, proponents of the New
Jersey Rule argue that the manufacturer places the product on the
"market" and thus, receives a benefit. 114 By phrasing the benefits
theory using the word "market," the New Jersey Rule proponents
seemingly encompass a non-designing manufacturer within the theory.
The inquiry then turns to which party placed the product on the market.
When a buyer requires a manufacturer to use the buyer's design, the
buyer is the party responsible for placing the final product on the
market. The buyer designs the specifications that are the foundation of
the product. The buyer then employs the product as a tool of commerce,
thus exposing foreseeable users, usually the buyer's own employees, to
the actual risk of injury caused by the defective design. 115 By initiating the design at the inception and then using the final product, the
buyer is the party that places the product on the market. 116 Moreover,

income from large quant1t1es of continuous sales to the public, non-designing
manufacturers are engaged in one-time sales of custom-made products. Thus, a nondesigning manufacturer might not be a candidate for strict liability in the same way a
retailer is. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 46, § 402A cmt. f ("The rule does not ...
apply to the occasional seller ... who is not engaged in that activity as a part of his
business.") Moreover, even the application of strict liability to retailers has not been
unequivocally accepted. Frank J. Cavico, Jr., The Strict Tort Liability of Retailers,
Wholesalers, and Distributors of Defective Products, 12 NOVA L. REV. 213, 226-33
(1987).
114. E.g., Shubatt, supra note IOI, at 122.
115. In other words, the buyer makes the design and then, rather than building it,
employs a manufacturer. The buyer then takes the product back and places it in the
market by using it as a tool of commerce. Whether the buyer follows its own design or
hires a manufacturer to follow the design, the defect is created by the buyer; the product,
with the defect, is released into the market by the buyer. If the design is defective, it
would seem that the issue of which party followed the design would be irrelevant.
116. A more tenuous rebuttal would be to quibble with semantics, namely the word
"market." Market is defined as a "[p]lace of commercial activity in which goods,
commodities, securities, services, etc., are bought and sold." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
970 (6th ed. 1990). Even if one were to assume that the manufacturer ultimately places
the product where it is susceptible to coming into contact with innocent users, a strict
construction of the enterprise liability definition reveals that custom-made products are
not necessarily placed in the "market." Rather, they are usually placed in the buyer's
factory.
For example, as you will recall from the facts of the Moon case, the defendant
manufacturer, Winger Boss, produced equipment for Iowa Beef Processors, Inc. See
supra part III.A. If it is said that Winger Boss "placed" the final product somewhere,
it was clearly in Iowa Beefs assembly line. An assembly line is not typically a place
where commodities, services, securities, etc. are bought and sold. Therefore, it follows,
from a strict semantics standpoint, that enterprise liability is inappropriate for a situation
in which a manufacturer carries out the plans and specifications of a buyer and
manufactures an item to be used by the buyer solely as a means of production. The
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given the buyer's extensive involvement in the process, the buyer
receives the largest net "benefit" from the transaction. The buyer not
only creates the product's design, it reaps the benefits by enjoying the
use of the product. By fixating on the buzz-phrases "placing a product
on the market" and "deriving benefits from the public," the benefits
theory provides little support for the New Jersey Rule.
In the context of a manufacturer complying with a buyer's design, the
focus should be on the defect, rather than on which party put a product
on the market and gained benefits. The focus should first be on the
buyer's defective design and then on which party is responsible for
injuries that arise as a result. Indeed, in a design defect case, the design
is the problem. The Nebraska Rule, unlike the New Jersey Rule,
appropriately focuses on the buyer's design at the outset. Once it has
been determined that a defect exists, 117 the Nebraska Rule will impute
the defective design to the non-designing manufacturer if the design is
so blatantly defective that an ordinary and reasonable manufacturer
would not have followed it. 118 The focus is on the buyer's defective
design and then on the manufacturer's conduct.
The result of the Nebraska Rule, when juxtaposed with the New Jersey
Rule in this respect, is that the Nebraska Rule fulfills the policy of
enterprise liability in a more equitable manner because it is based on
fault. Under the Nebraska Rule, enterprise liability in every case will be
effectuated by a party, other than the victim, which should bear the
burden of the cost of injury. True, it may not always be the manufacturer, but it will be the party responsible for the defect that causes injury.
The Nebraska Rule, unlike the New Jersey Rule, is not forced to dictate
liability based on abstract notions of which party "places" the product
on the market and reaps the corresponding "benefits."

3.

Risk Spreading

As a major subsection of enterprise liability, the New Jersey Rule
embraces the concept of risk spreading: the view that a manufacturer is
better able to bear the cost of injuries.11 9 Under the New Jersey Rule,
product never enters the "market."
117. For the standard that Nebraska courts use to determine whether strict liability
applies for a design defect, see supra note 39.
118. Moon v. Winger Boss, Inc., 287 N.W.2d 430, 434 (Neb. 1980).
119. See, e.g., Shubatt, supra note IOI, at 123; Wade, supra note 102, at 826.
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even if a non-designing manufacturer is not in a better position to predict
or prevent design defects, and even if the focus should be on a buyer's
design, the inequitable imposition of liability on a blameless party is
justified under the risk spreading rationale because it is freely assumed
that a non-designing manufacturer is simply the most able to sustain the
financial burden of liability. 120 This concept of risk spreading is
frequently argued by proponents of strict liability, 121 wherein it is
maintained that the resulting burden of risk spreading on a blameless
party can be alleviated through indemnity and liability insurance.
Whereas the Nebraska Rule would not impose the burden of risk
spreading on an innocent non-designing manufacturer, the New Jersey
Rule offers indemnity and insurance alternatives in an attempt to
alleviate the adverse effects of strict liability. 122 In evaluating and
contrasting the Nebraska and New Jersey Rules, it is necessary to
investigate how well indemnity or insurance reduces or eliminates the
burden on a non-designing manufacturer under the risk spreading
rationale of the New Jersey Rule.
But first, we should get our bearings straight. As a brief review: the
risk spreading rationale is justified by indemnity and liability insurance
options, which will now be discussed. Risk spreading is a subsection of
enterprise liability. Enterprise liability, in tum, is one of three major
justifications for imposing strict liability. The three justifications are
used as alternatives to justifying liability based on fault.

(a)

Freedom of Contract and Indemnity

In an attempt to soften the harshness of strict liability on a manufacturer that in good faith complies with a buyer's defective design, the
120. Shubatt, supra note JOI, at 123; Wade, supra note 102, at 826.
121. Cf Traynor, supra note I 12, at 375-76. Justice Traynor recognized that
manufacturers are better able to sustain the costs of liability because "the risk of injury
can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing
business." Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d
436, 441 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). However, Justice Traynor recognized that
limits should be imposed on the manufacturer's liability under notions of risk-spreading.
Any system of enterprise liability or social insurance designed to replace
existing tort law as the means for compensating injured parties should provide
adequate but not undue compensation.... [O]nce adequate compensation for
economic loss is assured, consideration might well be given to establishing
curbs on such potentially inflationary damages as those for pain and suffering.
Traynor, supra note 112, at 376; accord Seffert v. L.A. Transit Lines, 56 Cal. 2d 498,
509, 364 P.2d 337, 344, 15 Cal. Rptr. 161, 168 (1961) (Traynor, J., dissenting). In
advocating the extension of enterprise liability to include "business premises" liability
cases, Professors Nolan and Ursin similarly argue that pain and suffering damages should
be limited in strict liability cases. See NOLAN & URSIN, supra note 108, at 168.
122. Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Corp., 451 A.2d 179, 185 (N.J. 1982).
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New Jersey Rule offers alternative contractual justifications for risk
spreading, based on freedom of contract and indemnity. Under
traditional freedom of contract theory, parties are left free from
governmental interference when entering into contracts. 123 However,
the New Jersey Rule disregards the fact that a non-designing manufacturer is contractually bound to follow a buyer's design; judicial intervention
trumps freedom of contract. For instance, to be held strictly liable for
a defect, a manufacturer must exert "control" over a product. 124 In
Michalko, Cubby maintained that because it was contractually bound to
follow Elastimold's design, it did not exert control over the transformer
press or its design. Imposing liability would frustrate the "freedom of
contract" by punishing a party for following its obligations under a
contract.
The Michalko court rejected this argument because such a policy
would "leave the determination as to the safety of the product and
investment allocation in safety to the private marketplace," which would
ultimately be unsatisfying. 125 Under the contract, Cubby did not have
control over the design and thus had no control over the product. But
the court disregarded this in favor of its own social policy, and held
Cubby strictly liable. As Professor Farnsworth notes, the individualism
found in traditional rules of freedom of contract have, with the advent
of the twentieth century, been seen as somewhat incompatible with
modern social needs. 126 In other words, the sanctity of performing the

123.
124.
125.
126.

FARNSWORTH, supra note 65, § 1.7.
See, e.g., Michalko, 451 A.2d at 185.
Id.

FARNSWORTH, supra note 65, § 1.7. Professor Farnsworth notes,
It was generally supposed during [the nineteenth century] that, as Adam
Smith had proclaimed, freedom of contract - freedom to make enforceable
bargains - would encourage individual entrepreneurial activity.... From a
utilitarian point of view, freedom to contract maximizes the welfare of the
parties and therefore the good of society as a whole. From a libertarian point
of view, it accords to individuals a sphere of influence in which they can act
freely.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). However, with the advent of capitalism, the
concept of the free market became engulfed by the reality of monopoly. Government
regulation became prevalent, leaving only some of the bargaining process to the parties.
In some cases, government regulation would control all of a contract's tenns, such as
fire-insurance contracts and ocean bills of lading. Id. Restricting classic notions of
freedom of contract also helped to prevent unfair commercial acts or coercion in the
bargaining process.
Important inroads on the principal of freedom of contract have been made
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contractual terms leaves unredressed the injuries caused by a defective
design and therefore, necessitates judicial intervention and mandate. The
New Jersey Rule accordingly rejects the traditional freedom of contract
theory. For this reason a non-designing manufacturer's contractual
obligation to build machinery according to an owner's design is
irrelevant under the New Jersey Rule. 127
In addition to alluding to the diminished importance of traditional
freedom of contract notions, the New Jersey Supreme Court suggested
that indemnification might limit any harsh results. 128 In essence, a
non-designing manufacturer could seek indemnity from the buyer/designer and relieve itself from the threat of strict liability for the
buyer's design. This could be incorporated as a term of the contract
between the manufacturer and the buyer. In theory, even if the buyer's
design is deemed defective, the manufacturer, as a potential defendant,
can avoid the financial burden of a liability judgment. The manufacturer
would be legally liable to the plaintiff, but financially insulated by
indemnity.
Referring to this notion of indemnity, the Michalko court asserted that
"[t]he question ofCubby's liability for work done at Elastimold's request
and under Elastimold's directions is a matter that could have been
addressed in the explicit terms of the private contract between the
parties." 129 True, an agreement of indemnification does seem like a
feasible solution to a non-designing manufacturer's predicament,
especially when the buyer is insisting on using its own design. Ideally,

by legislation passed to redress some real or supposed imbalance of bargaining
power. . . . In all these cases the main relationship between the parties is still
based on agreement, but many of the obligations arising out of it are imposed
or regulated by law.
G.H. TREITEL, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 3 (8th ed. 1991) (citations omitted).
Although the legislature was instrumental in effectuating this regulation, the courts
had, and continue to have, an important role as well. In fact, courts in jurisdictions
adopting the Uniform Commercial Code now have the authority to invalidate entire
contracts that are deemed "unconscionable." U.C.C. § 2-302 (1977). This judicial
power over contracts is also illustrated by the New Jersey Rule's approach to holding
a non-designing manufacturer strictly liable for design defects, even in the face of the
manufacturer's contractual duty to carry out the buyer's design.
127. See Michalko, 451 A.2d at 183-84.
128. Indemnity has been defined as follows: "Under a contract of indemnity, one
party (the indemnitor) promises to hold another party (the indemnitee) harmless from loss
or damage of some kind, irrespective of the liability of any third person." FARNSWORTH,
supra note 65, § 6.3, at n.5.
129. Micha/ko, 451 A.2d at 185. Hence, pursuant to an express indemnity
agreement, the manufacturer could have sought indemnity from the plaintiff's employer.
Presumably, the plaintiff's employer was limited in its liability by workers' compensation statutes. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-1 (West 1988). Yet an express indemnity
agreement can supersede this limitation of liability on the employer. See infra note 135.
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a reasonable-minded buyer can be expected to accommodate a request
of indemnity and stand with confidence behind its design. But the New
Jersey Rule's suggestion of indemnity is ineffective for three reasons.
First, a manufacturer who agrees to build according to a buyer's plans
and specifications often is awarded the contract through a bidding
process. 130 Presumably, a buyer looks for bids with the least financial
burdens. An indemnity clause is a potential financial burden that is
unattractive to a buyer considering different bids. Thus a manufacturer
who requires a buyer to accept an indemnification clause may be less
competitive. Similarly, the possibility of having to reimburse a liability
judgment will be viewed by a buyer as an undesirable financial risk,
even if the risk is remote. This makes the cautious manufacturer who
seeks an indemnity clause less competitive than manufacturers who do
not seek an indemnity clause.
A second reason the New Jersey Rule's suggestion of indemnity is
ineffective is that an indemnity agreement may be unnecessary. As
Prosser & Keeton state, in the law of torts "[t]he right to indemnity may
. . . arise without agreement, and by operation of law to prevent a result
which is regarded as unjust or unsatisfactory." 131 Yet even if a nondesigning manufacturer that suffers a strict liability judgment is allowed
to seek indemnification as a matter of law, there is still the injustice of
making the manufacturer bear the cost of bringing the action of
indemnity. At this point, the manufacturer has already incurred the costs
of defending the buyer's faulty design in the strict liability action.
Moreover, there is always the possibility that the buyer is insolvent; this
would be one reason the plaintiff sues the manufacturer. Insolvency
makes the indemnity action totally worthless.
The third reason the New Jersey Rule's suggestion of indemnity is
ineffective is that even if a buyer/designer is solvent, a non-designing
manufacturer will still most likely be unable to recover the strict liability
cost through indemnity due to an employer's insulation under workers'
compensation statutes. Under these statutes, an employer has a predetermined amount for which it will be liable if an injury occurs in the

130. See, e.g., Moon v. Winger Boss Co., Inc., 287 N.W.2d 430,431 (Neb. 1980).
Bids may be submitted on forms provided by the buyer. Naturally, these forms contain
provisions that favor the buyer. A bidder will consequently have difficulty inserting its
own terms into the bidding process.
131. KEETON ET AL., supra note 52, § 51, at 341.
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workplace. 132 The effect this has on the injured employee will be
discussed in the ensuing text, but the issue of workers' compensation
arises when a non-designing manufacturer suffers a liability judgment for
a design defect and then seeks indemnity. Because indemnity is the
process by which the entire burden of liability is shifted from the losing
party in the initial suit to another party, 133 it implicitly does violence
to the legislative mandate of liability ceilings for employers in work
related injuries. 134
For example, suppose a non-designing manufacturer, free of fault,
suffers a strict liability judgment for a design defect under the New
Jersey Rule. The employer who created the design would only be liable
to its employee pursuant to the statutory workers' compensation limit.
The employee in turn would collect this payment as a matter of right.
Once the non-designing manufacturer is sued for damages, it is
effectively precluded from seeking indemnity by virtue of the workers'
compensation statute. If the employer is made to indemnify the
manufacturer for the damages awarded in the strict liability action, it will
far exceed the limit of liability imposed by the legislature. Judicial
activism should not trump the will of the legislature. Indeed, when
dealing with claims that fall within the confines of workers' compensation, the courts have not been receptive to the idea of third parties
seeking indemnity from employers for suits brought by injured employees. 135

132. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600 (West 1989 & Supp. 1994); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN.§ 23-1022 (1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 31-293a (1987); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 19, § 2304 (1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.10 (West 1991); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN.§ 418.131 (West 1985); MISS. CODE ANN.§ 71-3-9 (1989); N.Y. WORK.
COMP. LAW § 10 (McKinney 1992); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 102.03 (West 1988).
133. FARNSWORTH, supra note 65, § 6.3, at n.5; Jayne F. Lynch, The Clash Between
Strict Products Liability Doctrine and the Workers' Compensation Exclusivity Rule: The
Negligent Employer and the Third-Party Manufacturer, 50 INS. COUNS. J. 35, 48 (1983).
Under indemnity, "the entire burden of lawsuit liability is transferred from the sued party
to another." Id.
134. !fan employer pays the worker's compensation payment and then indemnifies
the non-designing manufacturer for the strict liability judgment, it will far exceed the
limitation of liability imposed by statute. For this reason, "[t]he use of indemnity in a
triad involving an injured employee, a negligent employer, and a third-party manufacturer is limited." Lynch, supra note 133, at 48.
135. E.g., Privette v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. 4th 689, 698, 854 P.2d 721, 727, 21
Cal. Rptr. 72, 77-78 (1993); Gauthier v. O'Brien, 618 So. 2d 825, 828 (La. 1993); see
also Lynch, supra note 133, at 48-49. When dealing with worker's compensation issues,
the exclusivity rule inevitably arises. The exclusivity rule holds that under worker's
compensation, an employer shall not be held liable over the statutory amount. 2 ARTHUR
LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION FOR OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES AND DEATH§§ 6566 (Desk ed. 1980). Indeed, when a third party seeks indemnity from an employer of
an employee to whom the third party has been held liable, the courts find few exceptions
to the exclusivity rule. There are, however, situations in which courts allow indemnity
suits against employers despite the exclusivity rule. See, e.g., Lockheed Aircraft Corp.
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Thus, under the New Jersey Rule, a non-designing manufacturer held
strictly liable for a design defect will, with some exceptions,1 36 be

v. United States, 460 U.S. 190 (1983). "The third party may recover over against the
employer whenever it can be said that the employer breached an independent duty
toward the third party and thus acquired an obligation to indemnify the third party."
Arthur Larson, Third-Party Action Over Against Workers· Compensation Employer, 1982
DUKE L.J. 483, 500.
One exception where indemnity is allowed is when there is an express agreement
where the employer agrees to indemnify the third party. Id.; see also Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., v. J.M. Tull Metals Co., 629 So. 2d 633 (Ala. 1993) (allowing indemnity
pursuant to an express agreement, thereby overruling Alabama's precedent refusing to
enforce such an agreement); Benner v. Wichman, 874 P.2d 949 (Alaska 1994)
(approving indemnity only if there is an express agreement); CAL. LAB. CODE § 3864
(West 1989) ("[T]he employer shall have no liability to reimburse ... such third person
... in absence of a written agreement to do so executed prior to injury.") Also, even if
there is no express agreement, sometimes, albeit rarely, implied indemnity is allowed.
See Karen M. Moran, Note, Indemnity Under Workers' Compensation: Recognizing a
Special legal Relationship Between Manufacturer and Employer, 1987 DUKE L.J. I 095,
1106. This implied indemnity is based on either the common law notion that one party
should not pay for another's culpable behavior or on the notion that the employer has
breached an independent duty to the third party. Id. However, courts are even less
receptive to notions of implied indemnity. See, e.g., Benner, 874 P.2d at 956; Goodyear
Tire, 629 So. 2d at 638; see also Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Modem Status of Effect of
State Workmen's Compensation Act on Right of Third-Person Tortfeasor to Contribution
or Indemnity from Employer of Injured or Killed Workman, 100 A.L.R.3d 351, 368-84
( 1980) (listing an extensive array of state court decisions where different indemnity
arguments were made).
136. As an alternative to indemnity, a minority of courts allow for contribution,
despite the existence of worker's compensation statutes. Whereas indemnity allows one
party to shift the entire burden of liability to another, contribution requires one tortfeasor
to pay a portion of a liability judgment, while transferring the remaining portion to
another tortfeasor. See Fleming James Jr., Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: A
Pragmatic Criticism, 54 HARV. L. REV. 1156 (1941). "Contribution requires that the
contributor and contributee share a common liability to the injured plaintiff as well as
joint tortfeasor status." Lynch, supra note 133, at 49. Note, however, that the notion of
contribution assumes that each party making a contribution is at fault for the injury.
Hence, within the realm of a non-designing manufacturer that follows a buyer's design,
proof of fault on the part of the buyer would have to be shown, presumably, before a
contribution claim would even be considered by a court.
Nevertheless, insofar as the general issue of third parties seeking contribution from
employers in the face of worker's compensation statutes is concerned, mostjurisdictions
in the United States do not permit a contribution action to be brought by a third party
against the third party's employer. See Michael S. Schachter, Kotecki v. Cyclops
Welding Corp.: A Judicial Balancing Act, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 741, 759 n.125 (1992)
(listing the holdings of the majority of jurisdictions); Lynch, supra note 133, at 49.
However, the Illinois Supreme Court has held that a contribution claim may be brought
by a third party, but that the employer's liability is limited by the statutory liability
ceiling of worker's compensation. Kotecki v. Cyclops Welding Corp., 585 N.E.2d 1023,
I 028 (Ill. I 99 I). Prior to Kotecki, the Illinois Supreme Court even allowed for
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unable to relieve the financial burden through the process of indemnity.137
Furthermore, although the blameless manufacturer faces
excessive liability, the employer responsible for the defective design
enjoys insulation from both strict liability and indemnity, even in cases
where the employer was negligent. Conversely, in the face of workers'
compensation, the Nebraska Rule's refusal to hold a non-designing
manufacturer liable without culpability avoids the inequitable results
produced by risk spreading.
Because a policy of strict liability is victim compensation, 138 keeping
the manufacturer as a viable source of recovery helps ensure the
fulfillment of one of the strict liability objectives. This does not mean,
however, that indemnity principles, by party agreement or otherwise, can
cure the resulting inequity of the policy of enterprise liability (namely
risk spreading). The suggestion of indemnity by proponents of the New
Jersey Rule as a mitigating force against the adverse effects of risk
spreading is ultimately ineffective. 139 However, as an alternative to

contribution by the employer in an amount that corresponded to the employer's degree
of culpability. Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 374 N.E.2d 437 (Ill.
I 977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 946 {1978).
137. Cf supra note 135. The Michalko court indicated that it would have allowed
an indemnity claim by defendant Cubby against the employer, Elastimold, despite the
worker's compensation statute, if there had been an express indemnity agreement specifically addressing this type of liability. "The question of Cubby's liability for work done
at Elastimold's request and under Elastimold's directions is a matter that could have
been addressed in the explicit terms of the private contract between the parties."
Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Corp., 451 A.2d 179, 185 (N.J. 1983); accord
Benner, 874 P.2d at 956; Goodyear Tire, 629 So. 2d at 635-38.
138. Wade, supra note 102, at 826; Wildman & Farrell, supra note 10, at 139;
Shubatt, supra note IOI, at 123. Indeed, the Michalko court expressed this notion in
espousing the New Jersey Rule. "[A]s between plaintiff, an innocent user of the
machine, ... [and the manufacturer], it is incontestably fairer to impose the cost of the
accident on the latter." Michalko, 451 A.2d at 185; cf Traynor, supra note 112, at 36667 ("It should be clear that the manufacturer is not an insurer for all injuries caused by
[its] products ... [w]hen the injury is in no way attributable to a defect there is no basis
for strict liability.").
139. If the indemnity concept is dissected, several scenarios surface. First, assume
that a designing buyer is financially able to cover the cost of liability. If the
manufacturer has implemented an indemnity agreement, the agreement should be
enforced. See Michalko, 451 A.2d at 185. If there is not an indemnity agreement, then
an indemnification of the manufacturer by the buyer may exist by operation of Jaw. See
Moran, supra note 135, at 1106; see also Cartel Capital Corp. v. Fireco, 410 A.2d 674,
682-83 (N.J. 1980).
Second, assume that a designing buyer is not financially able to cover the cost of
liability. If an indemnity agreement exists, it should be legally enforceable, yet will
remain financially unenforced. If no agreement exists, in theory it may be that the
manufacturer should be able to seek indemnity, yet realistically it is near impossible. See
supra note 135.
In each case, the manufacturer remains a front runner for paying compensation,
whereas manufacturer indemnification remains a secondary, idealistic scheme for
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indemnity, the New Jersey Rule offers the concept of liability insurance
as a means of alleviating the harshness of strict liability. In keeping
with the policy of risk spreading, it is assumed that the non-designing
manufacturer can protect itself through insurance and offset the loss as
a cost of doing business.
(b)

Liability Insurance 140

As Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court originally
proclaimed in advocating strict liability, "the risk of injury can be
insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost
of doing business." 141 As a means of reducing the harshness of the
New Jersey Rule's imposition of liability on a non-designing manufacturer, however, the liability insurance alternative is unsatisfactory.
Reliance on third party insurance serves to complicate, rather than
eliminate, the burden that risk spreading imposes on a non-designing
manufacturer.
Insurance is a system in which one party, the insured, transfers a risk
to another party, the insurer, in consideration of a premium. 142
fairness. It is for this reason that the New Jersey Court's suggestion of indemnity is
futile.
140. Liability insurance is also referred to as third party insurance. "Under a
liability policy the insurer is required to make payment although the insured has not yet
suffered any loss, for by definition the purpose of the liability policy is to shield the
insured from being required to make any payment on the claim for which [s]he is
liable." 11 MARKS. RHODES, COUCH CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW 2d § 44:4 (Rev.
ed. 1982). Liability insurance can be specifically geared to protect a manufacturer
against liability for injury to another party's person or property caused by the
manufacturer's product. Id. § 44:387; see also I A.LI. REPORTER'S STUDY, ENTERPRISE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 66-72 (1991) [hereinafter A.L.I. STUDY].
141. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d
436, 441 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring); see also Wade, supra note 102, at 876
(explaining that a manufacturer's ability to obtain liability insurance and spread the cost
as a cost of doing business is a key rationale behind strict liability); RESTATEMENT,
supra note 46, § 402A cmt. c (explaining that a manufacturer is better able to sustain
the burden of paying for accidents, mainly through liability insurance). The court in
Rawlings also described California's theory of strict liability, as "spreading the cost of
compensating victims throughout society as a cost of doing business by the manufacturer." Rawlings v. D.M. Oliver, 97 Cal. App. 3d 890, 897, 159 Cal. Rptr. I 19, 122
(1979).
142. See ROBERT H. JERRY, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 11-15 (1987). On
a superficial level, the phrase "transfer the risk" is somewhat misleading. In a typical
insurance agreement, the insured does not transfer the entire risk. Rather, the insurer
provides partial coverage, 80% for example, because total elimination of the risk from
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Liability insurance is viewed by proponents of the New Jersey Rule as
a means for the manufacturer to relieve itself of the burden of a liability
judgment: if a manufacturer is liable, the insurer will pay the victim.
Through an insurance contract, the insurer assumes the risk. 143 "Yet
insurance, by removing from the defendant the threat of actual liability,
obviously calls into question [strict liability] law's ability to achieve
deterrence." 144
Ironically, insurance can frustrate the deterrence goal of the New
Jersey Rule. With the protection of insurance, manufacturers may feel
less threatened by the potential of being held strictly liable for defects.
Thus, non-designing manufacturers could become moral hazards. 145
These manufacturers could hypothetically comply with designs that are
obviously defective whenever it appears profitable to do so. More
realistically, the reduced threat of actual liability due to the shield of
insurance would make a non-designing manufacturer less discriminating
when undertaking compliance with a buyer's design, enabling more
defective products to reach the market.
In this respect, the New Jersey Rule's goal of risk spreading through
insurance lessens the impact of deterrence. By contrast, the Nebraska
Rule would prevent this moral hazard altogether by holding only
culpable manufacturers liable. Liability would be imposed in more
predictable instances: when a manufacturer is at fault. In other words,
the Nebraska Rule's fault standard would not present the same unforeseeable risk of liability as the New Jersey Rule's strict liability, where
liability can attach simply because the manufacturer was the named
party. Because there is less risk of unforeseeable liability under the
Nebraska Rule, less insurance is needed. A non-designing manufacturer
would be compelled to abstain from following unreasonable designs, by
the threat of liability based on fault, and would likewise not need extra

the insured might encourage the insured to take less precautions because of the coverage.
Id. at 13. This is known as co-insurance. Id.
143. The risk to the insurer is not of the same magnitude as it is to the insured.
This is due to the fact that the insurer can pool the risks with those of other insureds.
This is known as a pooling effect. Under this effect, "[i]nsurers are willing to assume
the risk because with a large number of exposures, the number of losses becomes more
predictable." ROBERT I. MEHR ET AL., PRINCIPALS OF INSURANCE 31 (8th ed. 1985).
This is due to the law of large numbers: "[t]he greater the number of exposures, the
more nearly will the actual results obtained approach the probable result expected with
an infinite number of exposures." Id. at 34. Hence, by accumulating a pool of risks, an
insurer is better able to predict its losses and can thus deal more effectively with risks.
144. Gary T. Schwartz, The Ethics and the Economics of Tort Liability Insurance,
75 CORNELL L. REV. 313, 313 (1990).
145. Moral hazard refers to "the tendency of any insured party to exercise less care
to avoid an insured loss than would be exercised if the loss were not insured." KENNETH
S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 4 (1990).
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insurance coverage for unforeseeable strict liability judgments.
Conversely, the New Jersey Rule requires more insurance and then
spreads the loss for torts that the Nebraska Rule would deter from
occurring. The New Jersey Rule necessitates a greater reliance on
liability insurance because strict liability yields a greater quantity of tort
liability, since plaintiffs do not have to prove fault. The necessary
insulation of insurance, however, reduces the deterrence value of
liability.
The reliance on insurance as a means of decreasing the impact of
expansive liability under the New Jersey Rule also makes insurance
expensive. As illustrated by the insurance crisis of the mid-l 980s, 146
expanding tort liability can hamper both the availability and affordability
of liability insurance. 147 Expanding tort liability148 evolved from the
judicial system's attempt to provide compensation to more people
through the vehicle of enterprise liability. "Thus, courts have interpreted
policy coverage provisions broadly and policy exclusions narrowly to
achieve the compensation goal." 149 Greater liability causes the cost of

146. During this period, the tort litigation volume significantly increased and
insurance premiums skyrocketed in response. A.LI. STUDY, supra note 140, at 3-7
(providing discussions of various theories explaining the crisis).
147. George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96
YALE L.J. 1521, 1525 (1987) (arguing that the increase in tort liability has led to the
diminished availability of insurance coverage); cf Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson,
What Liability Crisis? An Alternative Explanation for Recent Events in Products
Liability, 8 YALE J. ON REG. I, 59-81 (1991) (arguing that expansion of tort liability
promotes the goals of the insurance system and furthers the deterrence objective of tort
law).
148. As Professor Priest explains, the expansion in tort liability is illustrated by the
reduction in the availability of many defenses, such as contributory negligence,
assumption of the risk, and product misuse, Priest, supra note 147, at 1535-36; see, e.g.,
Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 422-28 (Tex. 1984) (abolishing
assumption of the risk and unforeseeable product misuse defenses). Liability, by
contrast, has been extended through such notions as strict liability. Priest, supra note
147, at 1536. In addition to strict liability, further relaxations in the standards of liability
have become integrated into the tort system. E.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d
413, 434, 573 P.2d 443, 457, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 239 (1978) (invoking hindsight to
judge the defectiveness of a product); Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d
924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980) (establishing "market
share" theory in order to ease causation requirements).
149. Priest, supra note 147, at 1536. A notorious example of this is the notion that
any ambiguities in an insurance contract are interpreted against the insurer. E. Neil
Young et al., Insurance Contract Interpretation: Issues and Trends, 625 INS. L.J. 71, 75
(1975). Thus, an insured need only offer an alternative interpretation that is reasonable
and the insured may overcome any adverse provisions. See, e.g., Rusthoven v.
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premiums to increase, often drastically, whereas liability insurance
becomes less affordable and less available. 1so
In particular, a non-designing manufacturer faces a further paradox
regarding the cost of liability insurance: adverse selection. 1s1 Nondesigning manufacturers that carry out the specifications of buyers
typically perform relatively few projects per year, especially when
compared with the sophisticated production and distribution systems of
larger multinational manufacturers. The discrepancy in the quantity of
products produced makes these two groups of manufacturers subject to
different levels of risk. Larger manufacturers face an even greater threat
of liability under the expansion of tort liability. Because the insurance
industry offers liability insurance policies that are relatively universal,
small-scale manufacturers are sometimes in the same risk pool with
larger manufacturers that face greater risk. The value of insurance to a
smaller manufacturer is thus less than it is to a higher-risk manufacturer.
The eventual result is that lower risk manufacturers will cease purchasing liability insurance and rely on self-insurance mechanisms. As lower
risk manufacturers drop out, the premiums are increased for the
manufacturers that retain the insurance. According to Professor Priest,
this was a reason for the mid-1980s insurance crisis. In the context of
the New Jersey Rule, this phenomenon frustrates the concept of risk
spreading through the use of insurance; insurance becomes too expensive.
Nevertheless, assume a non-designing manufacturer operating under
the New Jersey Rule is easily able to obtain and maintain liability

Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 378 N.W.2d 642 (Minn. 1986). With approaches such
as the "ambiguity rule," greater insurance coverage complements the expansion of tort
liability to fulfill the goal of enterprise liability.
150. See Schwartz, supra note 144, at 320 ("[T]he insurance company sets its
premiums by taking into account the recent liability record of the insured .... "); Priest,
supra note 147, at 1525 ("[C]ontinued expansion of tort liability on insurance grounds
leads to a reduction in total insurance coverage available .... ").
151. Adverse selection refers to a situation where an insurer lacks relevant
information about the risks to which some insureds are susceptible. In other words, the
insureds know better than the insurer whether the insureds have high risks.
When insurers charge each party the same price for coverage, then high-risk
parties elect to be insured in greater proportion than low risk parties, and
insurers are forced to raise the price of coverage. As a result, some of the
comparatively low-risk parties that had previously been insured decline to
purchase coverage, the average degree of risk posed by the insurer's
policyholders rises, and the insurer is forced to raise prices again ....
ABRAHAM, supra note 145, at 4. According to Professor Priest, this phenomena of
adverse selection contributed intensely to the mid- l 980s insurance crisis. Priest, supra
note 147, at 1550-66, 1582-87. "Adverse selection in consumer risk pools explains why
the increase in insurance premiums has been extreme for products and services in recent
years." Id. at 1566.
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insurance to protect itself from any unforeseen defects in a buyer's
design. According to proponents of the New Jersey Rule, the cost to the
manufacturer can now be distributed to customers who insist on using
their own designs. 152 Simply put, these manufacturers could raise their
contract prices. However, these non-designing manufacturers are usually
relatively small, independent contractors, not world renowned financial
powerhouses like the Coca-Cola Bottling Company in Esco/a. Smallscale manufacturers who rely on a buyer's plans and specifications are
typically engaged in single-sale transactions of custom-made products. 153 Whereas a mass-producer of manufactured goods may be able
to realistically increase prices on products to cover liability costs, a nondesigning manufacturer may not; thus, a non-designing manufacturer
may not be able to pass on the price of liability insurance. Mathematically, there is a tremendous difference between a mass-producer slightly
increasing its price by a few pennies on each of the millions of bottles
of soda produced and a non-designing manufacturer attempting to deflect
the cost of liability insurance through single-sale transactions of custommade products. Remember that in this context, insurance for design
defects is perversely necessitated by the question of the viability of the
buyer's design. 154
A buyer might understand, however, that any increased contract prices
stem from the buyer's desire to use its own design. But the practice of
giving contracts to the lowest bidder undermines the manufacturer's
ability to pass on the cost of insurance. 155 When a designing buyer
accepts a variety of bids, it seeks out a manufacturer that can complete
the project for the lowest price. If a manufacturer feels compelled to
protect itself from unforeseen defects in the buyer's design--a wholly

152. See, e.g., Shubatt, supra note 101, at 123.
153. E.g., Moon v. Winger Boss, Inc., 287 N.W.2d 430 (Neb. 1980); Lenherr v.
NRM Corp., 504 F. Supp. 165 (D. Kan. I980). For a discussion of Lenherr, see supra
note 96.
154. This assumes the manufacturer never designs its own goods. On the other
hand, a manufacturer that does any design work might carry liability insurance.
However, the premiums of such a manufacturer would presumably increase if it engaged
in following the designs of other parties. The risk of defectiveness would increase,
especially from the perspective of the insurer, who is now being asked to insure against
possible defects in the designs of presently unknown third parties.
155. E.g., Moon, 287 N.W.2d at 430; Lenherr, 504 F. Supp. at 165.
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voluntary decision 156-any attempt to pass the subsequent cost on to
a one-time buyer in a bidding contest makes the manufacturer less
competitive.
The insurance alternative, like the indemnity option, ultimately proves
to be an ineffective way of reducing the burden that the New Jersey
Rule places on a non-designing manufacturer. The problems with
liability insurance in this context serve as an illustration of how the
process of risk spreading behind the goal of enterprise liability is not
achieved by the New Jersey Rule. Conversely, the Nebraska Rule
approximates enterprise liability in a more effective manner. There is
no need to justify imposing liability on a non-designing manufacturer
because the manufacturer will be liable only upon a showing of fault.
The Nebraska Rule obviates the need for justifying liability based on
idealistic theories, 157 such as risk spreading through insurance; the
results under the Nebraska Rule are equitable and thus, justifiable. The
strength of the New Jersey Rule is, however, demonstrated by the third
and final goal of strict liability: victim compensation.
C.

Victim Compensation

The major purpose behind the theory of strict liability is the goal of
victim compensation. 158 Both the Nebraska Rule and the New Jersey

156. Eventually, all manufacturers will need to purchase insurance under the New
Jersey Rule. This is the only way these manufacturers will be able to cover losses due
to increased liability. A counter argument to the contention that insurance is not a viable
means to deal with the effects of enterprise liability is that buyers will actually insist that
manufacturers have insurance coverage because the buyer is the next logical target if the
manufacturer cannot provide redress to an injured plaintiff. However, this argument
loses weight when worker's compensation statutes are considered because the buyer's
employee can only recover the statutory limit from the buyer; the threat of having an
injured employee sue her employer is minor.
In any event, if the New Jersey Rule is implemented in California, for example,
initially many manufacturers may be uninsured, or rely on self-insurance schemes. See
A.L.I. STUDY, supra note 140, at 83-84. The insured manufacturers that attempt to
deflect the cost of insurance through increased contract prices may not have as many
customers as manufacturers that rely on cheaper means of self-insurance or otherwise
remain uninsured. However, this will last until uninsured manufacturers are held liability
or otherwise realize that they must insure to deal with the New Jersey Rule. Thus,
manufacturers, under the New Jersey Rule, will be compelled to buy insurance.
I 57. Here I am speaking of risk spreading only in the context of non-designing
manufacturers. Admittedly, risk spreading may be a more workable theory in other
situations.
158. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal. 2d 435, 150 P.2d 436
(1944) (Traynor, J., concurring); see also Shubatt, supra note 101, at 121-24; William
L. Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J.
1099, 1120-24 (1960) (articulating arguments in favor of strict liability as a means of
victim compensation and giving critical responses).
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Rule stress victim compensation, but they do so in drastically different
ways and in significantly different amounts. By imposing strict liability,
the New Jersey Rule ensures that a non-designing manufacturer will be
available as a source of recovery. 159 The legal theory of strict liability
further purports to ease the burden of proof on an injured party, which
facilitates recovery. However, this is not without costs. In contrast, the
Nebraska Rule offers a means of victim compensation which avoids the
inequity of deflecting the burden of liability for a design defect to an
innocent non-designing manufacturer. The Nebraska Rule quells the
inequity of the New Jersey Rule.
Yet the Nebraska Rule leaves a victim of a design defect in a
compromising situation insofar as compensation is concerned. The
Nebraska Rule makes an injured party shoulder the burden of proving
fault on the part of a non-designing manufacturer. Moreover, if a
manufacturer is not at fault, a plaintiff may not recover from the
manufacturer, thus closing the door to one source of victim compensation. No matter how well each rule approximates the goal of victim
compensation, the profound impact of workers' compensation alters the
analysis. Workers' compensation statutes accentuate the existing
inequities and complicate notions of compensation. Thus, each rule must
be evaluated with it as a backdrop.
1.

The Effects of Workers ' Compensation

Workers' compensation statutes cover an injured party's employer in
a strict liability suit for a design defect. 160 The same holds true even

159. The New Jersey Rule offers an innocent victim of dangerously defective
machinery more sources for recovery. As the Michalko court stated, "[A]s between
plaintiff, an innocent user of [a] machine, and [defendant] Cubby, which rebuilt and
remade part of the product without a needed safety device, it is incontestably fairer to
impose the cost of the accident on the latter." Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Co.,
451 A.2d 179, 185 (N.J. 1983); accord Shubatt, supra note JOI.
160. Under the California Labor Code, a cause of action against an employer by an
employee is strictly limited.
Liability for the compensation provided by this division, in lieu of any other
liability whatsoever to any person ... shall, without regard to negligence, exist
against an employer for any injury sustained by his or her employees arising
out of and in the course of the employment ... [w]here, at the time of the
injury, the employee is performing service growing out of and incidental to his
or her employment and is acting within the course of his or her employment
CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600(a)(2) (West 1989 & Supp. 1994). See generally I ARTHUR
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if the action is based on negligence. 161 Under workers' compensation
statutes, the employer's liability for "work-related" injuries is a
statutorily established amount, pre-determined by payment schedules. 162 Because the amount recoverable is significantly lower than
what a liability judgment could yield, actions against third parties are
presumably irresistible to a plaintiff, regardless of any workers'
compensation payments received. 163 Although a detailed discussion
about workers' compensation is beyond the scope of this Comment, it
is necessary to briefly examine the effect it has on the New Jersey and
Nebraska Rules' respective ability to fulfill the goal of victim compensation.
A plaintiff whose injury is work-related and caused by a design defect
in the employers plans and specifications will be entitled to a workers'
compensation payment. If the non-designing manufacturer were at fault,
as defined by the Nebraska Rule, 164 then under both the New Jersey
and the Nebraska Rules the plaintiff would be able to seek additional
recovery from the manufacturer in a tort action. 165 In this situation,
both rules provide comparable opportunities to achieve equal levels of
victim compensation. But if a non-designing manufacturer is not at fault
for following the buyer's defective design, there is an acute divergence
between the two rules.

LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW passim (1995) (discussing the history and
theory of worker's compensation).
161. CAL LAB. CODE§ 3600 (West 1989 & Supp. 1994).
162. Id. Workers' compensation is an injured employee's sole remedy against the
employer:
Where the conditions of compensation set forth in Section 3600 concur, the
right to recover such compensation is, except as specifically provided in this
[title] ... the sole and exclusive remedy of the employee or his or her
dependents against the employer, and the fact that either the employee or the
employer also occupied another or dual capacity prior to, or at the time of, the
employee's industrial injury shall not permit the employee or his or her
dependents to bring an action at law for damages against the employer.
CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602(a) (West 1989).
163. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3852(A) (West 1989 & Supp. 1994) (stating that neither
a worker's compensation claim nor judgment shall bar suits against third parties); See
also Caroline Mitchell, Products Liability, Workmen's Compensation and The Industrial
Accident, 14 DuQ. L. R.Ev. 349, 361 (1975-1976) (stating that relatively low worker's
compensation payments make tort actions more attractive).
164. See supra note 50 and accompanying text for the Nebraska Rule.
165. Of course, it may be contended that because an injured plaintiff must show
fault on the part of a non-designing manufacturer to recover under the Nebraska Rule,
the Nebraska Rule does not provide the same opportunity for recovery in this instance
as the New Jersey Rule. Yet the difference in proof in the two rules is not as different
as one might imagine. See, e.g., Birnbaum, supra note 69, at 648. In fact, something
analogous to proving fault may be required of a plaintiff in a strict liability action,
namely proof of defectiveness. See sources cited supra note 69.
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If a manufacturer is not liable under the Nebraska Rule, the injured
employee would be stuck with only a workers' compensation payment.
Conversely, under the New Jersey Rule, the injured employee would be
able to recover an additional sum from the manufacturer in a strict
liability action, even if the manufacturer is completely free of fault.
Therefore, the New Jersey Rule's application is seemingly able to
provide greater victim compensation in light of the comparatively low
workers' compensation payment. Yet allowing a plaintiff to recover
workers' compensation from an employer, and then allowin?, the plaintiff
to sue a third party manufacturer, is unfair and inefficient. 66 The New
Jersey Rule forces a blameless manufacturer to pay because of an
employer's inept design; employers who are at fault for the design are
in essence protected by workers' compensation statutes, which leave the
manufacturer with the burden of paying the bulk of redress under strict
liability. 167 The result is that a blameless manufacturer may be the

166. See Pierre J. Schlag, Comment, A Critique of the Justifications for Employee
Suits in Strict Products Liability Against Third Party Manufacturers, 25 UCLA L. REV.
125, 126 (1977).
It . . . becomes difficult to determine whether an employee injured by a
product on the job should be compensated under workers' compensation or
strict products liability. The proper resolution of the paradox in terms of the
employee's rights against third party manufacturers would be to administer
compensation for those product injuries typical of the employment under
workers' compensation and those not typical of the employment under the
common law of strict products liability.
Id. at 165. As both Moon and Michalko illustrate, usually an injury resulting from a
buyer's design will happen in a work setting.
167. Lynch, supra note 133. An employer/designer/buyer would be able to draft
defective plans with the confidence that it would never be held liable over the statutory
limit. Thus, out of a concern for excessive costs for example, an employer would not
be completely reluctant to make a machine's design cheaper and less safe.
The workers' compensation exclusivity rule, which limits an employer's
liability to the statutory compensation paid to the employee for work-related
injuries, operates to protect the negligent employer for the consequences of its
wrongdoing to a considerable degree. The employer's immunity in tum
operates to saddle the manufacturer with the burden to compensate the
employee in amounts much greater than the manufacturer would have been
required to pay but for the employer-employee relationship and the exclusivity
rule of workers' compensation.
Id. at 35; see also Nancy A. Weston, The Metaphysics of Modem Tort Theory, 28 VAL.
U. L. REV. 919 (1994) (arguing that products liability suits are desirable even with
worker's compensation payments). The Nebraska Rule would deter buyers from
designing "less safe" products in order to save money because manufacturers under the
Nebraska Rule would not comply with "cheap" designs. See supra part V.A.
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only source of recovery for a plaintiff injured by virtue of a product's
defective design because, although the plaintiff's employer made the
defective design, workers' compensation statutes eliminate the employer
as a potential defendant.
True, if the Nebraska Rule is applied, some may argue that an injured
employee will be barred from recovery----except for the workers'
compensation payment--by the fortuitous fact that the employee was
within the scope of employment. A non-employee, on the other hand,
would be able to sue the employer for the same injury and reap a higher
recovery. It must be recognized, however, that workers' compensation
is a legislative enactment-the legislatures have determined that workers'
compensation systems provide the greatest social utility by guaranteeing
an injured employee a source of recovery. The trade-off for this
guaranteed recovery is a lower payment. At first glance, the New Jersey
Rule avoids this situation by ensuring the manufacturer remains a source
of recovery. Yet consider the inequity involved in the New Jersey Rule.
An innocent non-designing manufacturer is forced to pay a judgment to
the benefit of the ultimate tortfeasor. The plaintiff is compensated in
excess of its statutory rights of recovery at the expense of a blameless
party.
2.

Proposals to Change Workers' Compensation

This resulting inequity has led to two noteworthy proposals to change
the workers' compensation system. One proposal suggests that strict
liability actions against third parties should be barred and that the injured
employee should only have one source of recovery. 168 In essence, a
plaintiff would have to choose between a workers' compensation

168. See Philip D. Oliver, Once is Enough: A Proposed Bar of the Injured
Employee ·s Cause of Action Against a Third Party, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 117 ( 1989).
This proposal goes even a step further and argues that all actions against third parties
be barred. "[T]he proposal would bar the employee's suit against a third party, except
in those rare cases when the third party's actions, if committed by the employer, would
allow the employee to sue the employer under present law." Id. at 119. This is the
situation where the employer intentionally injures the employee. See 2A LARSON, supra
note 160, § 68. l 5.
But the proposal could present constitutional problems. By limiting the employee's
ability to seek recovery by banning suits against third parties in cases where workers'
compensation is applicable, it may be argued that the employee is being denied possible
property rights. Jonathan M. Weisgall, Product Liability in the Workplace: The Effect
of Workers' Compensation on the Rights and Liabilities of Third Parties, 1977 WIS. L.
REV. 1035, I 078. Likewise, if this proposal inhibits adequate compensation, a similar
claim of denial of property rights may exist. However, any claim would have to refute
the fact that the legislature has made a determination that the workers' compensation
system provides adequate compensation to injured employees.
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payment or a suit against a third party. This proposal recommends that
the workers' compensation payments should be increased, making suits
against third parties unnecessary. 169 In this respect, the Nebraska Rule
would allow the victim to recover for negligence if the victim can prove
that the non-designing manufacturer was at fault in causing the injury.
Of course, the more prudent route would be for the injured employee to
opt for the worker's compensation payment without the hassle and
uncertainty of litigation. 170 With an increased workers' compensation
payment, culpable employers could accordingly be held liable and
victims would receive adequate compensation by virtue of the larger payments. 171

169. Oliver, supra note 168, at 123.
[W]orkers' compensation should be the injured employee's sole remedy. The
principles underlying worker's [sic] compensation demand adequate compensation for all injured workers without reliance on additional tort recovery. If
present benefits are too low they should be increased, but adequate compensation should not depend upon the chance existence of a legally culpable third
party who is able to respond in damages.
Id. (citations omitted). Other commentators have suggested that where an employer has
been negligent, the injured employee should be allowed to maintain a second suit against
the employer. See, e.g., Theodore F. Haas, On Reintegrating Workers' Compensation
and Employers' Liability, 21 GA. L. REV. 843, 844 (1987) (indicating that because
workers' compensation payments are low, an injured employee should be able to recover
from the employer in tort as well-----provided the employer was negligent).
170. On this topic I have two thoughts in mind. First, without resorting to
litigation, the plaintiff can avoid having to carry the burden of proving fault. See
sources cited supra note 132. By contrast, the workers' compensation payment would
provide the plaintiff with comparatively quick compensation without the delays of
litigation. In making this comparison between an immediate workers' compensation
payment and the delays of litigation, I am assuming, of course, a situation where
settlements between the parties are not reached.
A second thought is that by choosing to litigate a claim based on fault, an injured
plaintiff would be wagering that its claim will pay off. A lawsuit might pay more than
a workers' compensation award. With plaintiffs wanting maximum compensation, and
their attorneys working on contingent fees, it is conceivable that in the face of a reliable
payment, many plaintiffs will take their chances in a lawsuit. Ultimately, increased
workers' compensation payments would be essential to preventing lawsuits.
171. The increased payments would, however, place the burden of compensation
entirely on the employer. Workers' compensation insurers would undoubtably offset
increased payments with corresponding increases in premiums. This seems to contradict
the purpose behind workers' compensation, i.e., limiting the liability of employers. As
a solution, manufacturers would be called on to contribute to the workers' compensation
payments.
Since the cost of workers' compensation insurance is home exclusively by
employers, an increase in workers' compensation benefits as part of an
exclusivity proposal would shift the entire burden of workplace injuries from
manufacturers to employers . . . . It would therefore appear that workers'
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A second proposal to reform workers' compensation is to replace it
with strict employment liability. 172 Under this system, an employer
would be held strictly liable for work-place injuries. 173 In our context
of non-designing manufacturers, innocent manufacturers would be spared
the burden of strict liability. This proposal would leave a non-culpable
manufacturer free from undue liability if coupled with the Nebraska
Rule. However, the proposal may go too far, especially in cases where
a non-designing manufacturer should have recognized and corrected a
design defect.
If the Nebraska Rule is applied, liability will be based on fault. With
strict employment liability, the inverse of our original problem would
result.
For instance, under the Nebraska Rule, a non-designing
manufacturer could be liable because of compliance with plans and
specifications that a reasonable manufacturer would not have followed.
But this same manufacturer escapes the imposition of deserved liability
by virtue of the employer being held strictly liable. It would be easier
for a plaintiff to recover from the employer in strict liability, rather than
having to prove a manufacturer was at fault. 174 Although this proposal

compensation as [a virtually] exclusive remedy would be viable only if a
manufacturer contributed to the increased costs of maintaining higher workers'
compensation benefit levels.
Weisgall, supra note 168, at 1072. To effectuate manufacturers making contributions
to workers' compensation schemes in order to increase workers' compensation payments,
several proposals have been offered. One way would be to enact comparative fault
statutes, such that an employer could bring an action of contribution against a
manufacturer once payments have been made. Id. at I 072-73. Another means would be
to rely on state workers' compensation boards or post-injury arbitration to determine a
manufacturer's obligation. Id. at 1073-74.
Presumably, this entire proposal also considers the fact that upon making a payment
pursuant to a workers' compensation statute, an employer or an employer's insurer can
seek indemnity from a third party. See, e.g.. Kubiszewski v. St. John, 518 N.W.2d 4,
5 (Minn. 1994) (quoting and explaining MINN. STAT.§ 176.061 (1994)).
172. Lynch, supra note 133, at 65-66. The workers' compensation system is strict
liability: if an employee is injured, she can recover from her employer the statutory
amount as a matter of right. Strict employment liability essentially allows an injured
employee a cause of action against the employer. In reality, it is a return to the situation
that existed before workers' compensation, where an injured employee's only recourse
was to sue in tort. See Haas, supra note 169, at 855.
173. Lynch, supra note 133, at 63.
174. Note, however, that the employer would still be at fault because the fact that
the manufacturer would be liable for following the plans and specifications means that
the design was defective. The employer drafted the defective plans and specifications,
so the imposition of liability, under strict employment liability or otherwise, is not
unjust. However, the culpable manufacturer would be able to hide behind strict
employment liability and avoid incurring liability in much the same way an employer
can hide behind worker's compensation under the current system.
Another problem with the proposed strict employment liability is that it may cut off
redress entirely. Instead of receiving automatic workers' compensation benefits, injured
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protects innocent manufacturers, it would leave some employers in the
same inequitable position of non-designing manufacturers under the New
Jersey Rule: liable for damages more appropriately attributable to
another party's failure to note and to correct the flawed design.
In any event, workers' compensation, under the current system,
impacts the policy of victim compensation. Although the Nebraska Rule
would hamper an employee's attempt to yield the highest possible
recovery, it would nonetheless ensure equal treatment and truly prevent
manufacturers from becoming insurers of their products. 175 Also,
under the Nebraska Rule, manufacturers that are at fault will be fully
available as a source of recovery, ensuring victim compensation.
VI.

INDICATIONS OF THE CALIFORNIA APPROACH

Although the California Supreme Court has not had the occasion to
address the issue of whether a non-designing manufacturer can be held
strictly liable for a defect in a buyer's design, one California court
demonstrated a tendency to follow the strict liability approach of the
New Jersey Rule. This was illustrated by the Court of Appeal for the
Fourth District's holding in Rawlings v. D.M. Oliver, lnc. 176 But
Rawlings is not a solid commitment to imposing strict liability on a nondesigning manufacturer, especially considering California's recent
restriction of strict liability rulings. Moreover, the California method for
determining whether a design is defective appears to be virtually
indistinguishable from a negligence standard. In actuality, the Nebraska
Rule seems to be a more appropriate means of executing the policies
behind holding non-designing manufacturers liable for design defects in
California.

employees would have to sue in strict liability. Therefore, there is the risk that the
employer could escape liability and thus, frustrate the policy of victim compensation
behind strict liability. Haas, supra note 169, at 855 n.43.
175. In response to criticisms of excessive liability under strict products liability,
proponents of expanding strict liability staunchly contend that strict liability will not
make manufacturers the insurers of their products. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co.,
Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 432, 573 P.2d 443, 456, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 238 (1978). While
this is debatable at best, the Nebraska Rule provides greater certainty: liability based on
fault guarantees manufacturers will not become insurers; they will not have to
compensate for unforeseen injuries, thus reducing their risk of liability.
176. 97 Cal. App. 3d 890, 159 Cal. Rptr. I I 9 (I 982).
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A.

Rawlings v. D.M. Oliver: The Fourth District Approach

In Rawlings, plaintiff was an employee of Kelco Company and was
responsible for operating a kelp drying machine. Defendant Oliver
manufactured 177 the machine in accordance with Kelco's plans and
specifications. 178 Plaintiff was engaged in cleaning the interior of one
of these drying machines when a co-employee mistakenly turned the
machine on. As a result, plaintiff sustained an injury to one of her
hands. Plaintiff sued Oliver, 179 alleging that the dryer's design was
defective 180 because it contained unguarded gears and lacked a shutdown device in case of an emergency. Oliver argued that strict liability
did not apply and that it could not be held strictly liable for merely
following Kelco's design. Both the argument and the court's ruling
against Oliver were terse.
Almost without explanation, the Rawlings court stated that "[a]
manufacturer may be liable for product defects based on negligence or
strict products liability even where the product is manufactured in
accordance with the owner's plans." 181 Oliver attempted to relf on the
holding in Barnthouse v. California Steel Buildings Co., 18 which
stated that "a general contractor is not liable to a third person for injuries
resulting from a structural defect where the contractor has performed in
accordance with the plans and specifications furnished by the owner .
183
• • •"
The court held this rationale inapplicable to the Rawlings case
for two reasons. First, according to the Rawlings court, the Barnthouse
holding did not give license to a contractor to follow plans and
specifications of an owner with impunity. If the contractor deviates
from the owner's plans, performs with carelessness, or creates an

177. The machine was manufactured by Warren Industrial Sheet Metal. Oliver
acquired Warren after the injury, but before the complaint. The main issue the court
sought to resolve was whether Oliver could be held liable as a successor corporation.
178. Rawlings, 97 Cal. App. 3d at 894, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 120.
179. Id. at 895, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 120.
180. See id. The court never referred directly to a "design" defect. However,
because the plaintiff alleged that the defectiveness was caused by a lack of safety
devices, it is implicit that the design was defective because Kelco had provided the plans
and specifications without any safety devices. As will be discussed, the application of
strict liability to a non-designing manufacturer due to a design defect was really a subissue in this case.
181. Id. at 894, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 120.
182. 215 Cal. App. 72, 29 Cal. Rptr. 835 (1963 ). Recall that the Moon court relied
on Barnthouse in articulating the Nebraska Rule. Moon v. Winger Boss Co., Inc., 287
N.W.2d 430, 434 (Neb. 1980).
183. Rawlings, 97 Cal. App. 3d at 896 n.l, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 121 n.l (interpreting
Barnthouse v. California Steel Bldgs. Co., 215 Cal. App. 72, 29 Cal. Rptr. 835 (1963)).
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unreasonably dangerous condition, Barnthouse implies that the contractor
faces liability. 184
The second reason why the Rawlings court held Barnthouse inapplicable was because the Rawlings court claimed that there is a significant
difference between a "manufacturer" and a "builder." 185 The exact
difference between a manufacturer and a builder remains unclear,
especially in the context of non-designing manufacturers that comply
with the plans and specifications of buyers. In actuality, non-designing
manufacturers, like builders, produce custom-made products according
to the specifications of an owner. Recall that the Moon court relied on
the Barnthouse opinion as precedent in formulating the Nebraska
Rule. 186 Both Barnthouse and Moon reflect the rationale behind
Restatement (Second) section 404 's treatment of parties who construct,
re-make, or build according to the plans of owners. Like the New Jersey
Rule, the Rawlings holding remains unsatisfying because it fails to
distinguish meaningfully between a builder and a manufacturer--especially a small-scale manufacturer who makes component parts
and custom-made products or who rebuilds equipment, all according to
the plans and specifications of the buyer.
The Rawlings court expressed that the "'paramount policy' to be
promoted by strict products liability" is victim compensation. 187 Like
the New Jersey Rule, the Rawlings holding treated this justification as
sufficient for holding a non-designing manufacturer strictly liable for a
defect in a buyer's design. 188 The court apparently classifies non-

184. See id.; see also Hannan, supra note 54, at 577-78.
185. See Rawlings, 97 Cal. App. 3d at 896 n.l, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 121 n.l ("We do
not belabor the distinction in strict products liability between a conventional manufacturer and a builder."); cf supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text (discussing a builder's
potential liability when following an owner's design).
I 86. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
187. Rawlings, 97 Cal. App. 3d at 897, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 122 (citing Price v. Shell
Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245,251,466 P.2d 722, 725-26, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178, 181-82 (1970)).
188. The New Jersey Rule also relies on notions of deterrence and enterprise
liability to justify the application of strict liability. Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem.
Corp., 451 A.2d 179, 185 (N.J. 1982). The notion of victim compensation as a primary
objective of strict liability is expressed in the Second Restatement of Torts.
On whatever theory, the justification for the strict liability has been said to
be that the seller [or manufacturer], by marketing [its] product[ s] for use and
consumption, has undertaken and assumed a special responsibility toward any
member of the consuming public who may be injured by it ... [and] that
public policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused by
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designing manufacturers in the same vein as the larger manufacturers
envisioned by Esco/a, which could supposedly sustain the financial
burdens of strict liability. But small-scale manufacturers that perform
custom projects in isolated transactions and according to a buyer's plans
and specifications do not fit the court's conception of manufacturers as
large entities engaged in mass marketing. Implicitly, California courts
seem to assume that indemnity principals or liability insurance will ease
or eliminate this burden. This assumption is mistaken in the context of
a non-designing manufacturer that conforms to the specifications of a
buyer, as discussed above. 189
The Rawlings decision is an inappropriate approach for California.
The Rawlings decision is inferior to the Nebraska Rule for the same
reasons the New Jersey Rule is inferior. Moreover, the Rawlings court
failed to fully develop the reasoning behind its hastily stated rule. In
fact, the rule articulated by the Rawlings court does not fully support the
New Jersey Rule. For instance, the court states that a non-designing
manufacturer that conforms to the specifications of a buyer "may" be
liable for a design defect. 190 The passive use of the word "may" is not
as forceful as the imperative language employed by the Michalko court
in espousing the New Jersey Rule. 191 Like the Nebraska Rule, the
Rawlings rule, using passive language, seems to hinge on other
circumstances, wherein the imposition ofliability requires the fulfillment
of prerequisites. In the Nebraska Rule, liability requires a showing of
fault on the part of the non-designing manufacturer. It is not clear what
"may" render a non-designing manufacturer liable under Rawlings; the
court did not elaborate on this point. Also, like the Nebraska Rule, the
Rawlings rule refers to both negligence and strict liability, whereas the

products intended for consumption be placed upon those who market them.
supra note 46, § 402A cmt. c. Although comment c assumes the context
of commercial trade by using words that deal with marketing and consumption, it
illustrates the notion of victim compensation. This is equally applicable to the New
Jersey Rule.
189. See supra part V.B.3(a) (discussing indemnity); supra part V.B.3(b) (discussing
liability insurance).
190. Rawlings, 97 Cal. App. 3d at 894, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 120. "A manufacturer may
be liable for product defects based on ... strict products liability even where the product
is manufactured in accordance with the owner's plans .... " Id. (emphasis added).
191. Recall the language the Michal/co court used in establishing the New Jersey
Rule: "(T]he fact that the product was built according to the plans and specifications of
(an] owner does not constitute a defense to a claim based on strict liability for the
manufacture[r] .... " Michalko, 451 A.2d at 183 (emphasis added). The wording of this
rule suggests that the application of strict liability for a design defect is a foregone
conclusion and that compliance with the buyer's design is not a defense. Compare this
imperative language with the passive, even permissive, language of Rawlings, supra note
190.
RESTATEMENT,
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New Jersey Rule exclusively contemplates strict liability.
The Rawlings rule is not indisputably supportive of the New Jersey
Rule. Rather, the court's mention of victim compensation resembles a
portion of the New Jersey Rule's rationale. Rawlings is the only
published California case dealing with the issue of non-designing
manufacturers and design defects. But Rawlings only represents one
district in California; it is binding on neither the California Supreme
Court nor other districts. It is necessary to tum our discussion to the
current state of California tort law, to see how the issue of holding a
non-designing manufacturer liable for a design defect fits into the overall
structure.

B.

Current Trends in Strict Products Liability Law in California

On a general level, strict liability standards are merging into negligence standards. 192 In California, the test for determining design
defects, articulated in Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., Inc., 193 resembles a
negligence standard. 194 This resemblance may make the Nebraska
Rule's insistence on proving fault compatible with California tort theory.
Moreover, California courts have recently begun to ease the liberal
application of strict liability in defect cases. Finally, the compatibility
of the Nebraska Rule with California's product liability jurisprudence
can be seen by the approach California courts have taken to cases in
which non-designing manufacturers comply with the plans and specifications of the federal government, which later prove to be defective. 195
192. Recall, for example, that in the Moon case, the plaintiff sued under a strict
liability theory, to which the court required a showing of fault on the part of the
manufacturer. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
193. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
194. The California Supreme Court has defined the negligence standard as follows:
"[N]egligence involves a legal duty to use due care, a breach of such legal duty, and the
breach as the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury." United States Liab. Ins.
Co. v. Hardinger-Hayes, Inc., I Cal. 3d 586,594,463 P.2d 770, 774, 83 Cal. Rptr. 418,
422 (1970). "Liability [for negligence] is imposed only if the risk of harm resulting
from the act is deemed unreasonable-i.e., if the gravity and likelihood of the danger
outweigh the utility of the conduct involved." Weirum v. RKO Gen., Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40,
47, 539 P.2d 36, 40, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468,472 (1975); compare United States v. Carroll
Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947) (explaining the Learned Hand formula for
determining unreasonable risks in negligence suits).
195. The government contractor defense shields a non-designing manufacturer from
liability if the federal government supplies or approves the design. See supra note 34.
One California court of appeal displayed a willingness to extend the government

441

1.

Evolution of the Strict Products Liability Standard

Under the Second Restatement of Torts section 402A, products that
are in a "defective condition," such that they are "unreasonably
dangerous," render the manufacturing party strictly liable for any injuries
caused. 196 Yet by making an injured plaintiff prove that a product was
"unreasonably dangerous," the plaintiff has the burden of proving an
"element which rings of negligence." 197 The California Supreme Court
refused to impose this burden on a plaintiff in a strict liability suit198
and instead, promulgated a substitute rule requiring proof of defectiveness. Upon proving a product was defective and the proximate cause of
an injury, a plaintiff could recover under strict liability. 199
In general, knowledge of a product's defectiveness is imputed to the
manufacturer because strict liability is liability without fault. 200 In

contractor defense into a commercial arena.
Plaintiff seems to argue that military equipment means a product made
exclusively for military use with no commercial purpose .... In our view, if
a product is produced according to military specifications and used by the
military ... and is incidentally sold commercially as well, that product may
nonetheless still qualify ... under the [government] contractor defense.
Jackson v. Deft, Inc., 223 Cal. App. 3d 1305, 1319, 273 Cal. Rptr. 214, 222 (1st Dist.
1990). In rejecting the argument that military equipment must be made for the
government in order to invoke the government contractor defense, the court apparently
recognized that it is more equitable to say a non-designing manufacturer cannot be held
liable for a design defect if it follows the specifications of a buyer.
196. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 46, § 402A.
197. Cronin v. JBE Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121,133,501 P.2d 1153, I 162, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 433, 442 (l 972); see also John L. Diamond, Eliminating the "Defect" in Design
Strict Products Liability Theory, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 529, 536 (1983). As professor
Diamond notes, the problem with the "unreasonably dangerous" standard advanced by
the Second Restatement § 402A is that it went beyond the burden of proof that should
be on the plaintiff:
The California [Supreme] [C]ourt has also expressed dissatisfaction with the
ambiguity of the phrase "unreasonably dangerous," [because it] is potentially
misleading to juries. Arguably, an "unreasonably dangerous defect" would
suggest to some jurors an intent to limit liability to only abnormally dangerous
or ultrahazardous defects, although such an interpretation was presumably not
intended by the drafters of the Restatement.
Diamond, supra, at 53 7 (citation omitted). This suggests that the plaintiff, in proving
the existence of an "unreasonably dangerous defect," would have the additional burden
of overcoming exaggerated juror misconceptions. Presumably, the heavy impact of the
definition of the phrase "unreasonably dangerous" is more easily appreciated by jurors
as laymen terms, rather than as a legal term of art.
198. See Cronin, 8 Cal. 3d at 133 & n.16, 501 P.2d at 1162 & n.16, 104 Cal. Rptr.
at 442 & n.16; see also Diamond, supra note 197, at 536-37.
199. See, e.g., Cronin, 8 Cal. 3d at 133, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442;
Ault v. Int'! Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 528 P.2d 1148, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1974).
200. Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Corp., 451 A.2d 179, 183 (N.J. 1982)
("Knowledge of a product's [defective] characteristics is imputed to the defendant."). But
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effect, if the product is defective, it does not matter whether the
manufacturer knew, should have known, or had no way of knowing
about the defect. "Once this knowledge has been imputed, the standard
is the same as a negligence standard."201 This relieves the plaintiff of
having to actually show negligence on the manufacturer's part. 202
Relief from proving negligence is thought necessary for a plaintiff.
As one commentator put it, "It is often difficult, or even impossible, to
prove negligence on the part of the manufacturer ...." 203 True, in the
context of a non-designing manufacturer that complies with a buyer's
specifications, the Nebraska Rule requires proof of negligence. Only if
the manufacturer knew or should have known the plans and specifications were unreasonable will the manufacturer be liable for the
defectiveness. 204 But this burden is not impossible.
For example, in Michalko, the defendant manufacturer was shown to
have actually known that a safety device was needed in Elastimold's
design. 205 Thus, Cubby's compliance with the design was contrary to
what a reasonable manufacturer would have done. A reasonable
manufacturer would not have agreed to follow unsafe plans unless the
appropriate safety devices could be installed. This fact would satisfy the
Nebraska Rule; the Nebraska Rule would have reached the same result
as the New Jersey Rule. Thus, the burden of proving fault in the context
of a non-designing manufacturer is not impossible. The plaintiff must
only show that a manufacturer should not have followed a buyer's
design. Moreover, the argument that a plaintiff must be relieved of the
cf Birnbaum, supra note 69, at 648 (criticizing this imputation of knowledge as
unnecessary).
20 I. Ellen Wertheimer, Unknowable Dangers and the Death of Strict Products
Liability: The Empire Strikes Back, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 1183, I 192 (1992); Birnbaum,
supra note 69, passim.
202. See sources cited supra note 201.
203. Wade, supra note 102, at 826. But cf Birnbaum, supra note 69, at 648 ("[A]s
almost every vigorously litigated design defect case shows, plaintiffs do in fact come
forward with detailed technical evidence tending to prove that [a] manufacturer was ...
aware of the nature and gravity of the risk .... "). In response to the tentative draft of
the Third Restatement ofTorts----which has a negligence standard for design defects---it
is argued that making an injured plaintiff prove fault will make it more difficult for the
plaintiff to recover because such an endeavor will be more expensive. Frank J. Vandall,
The Restatement (Third) of Torts, Products Liability, Section 2(b): Design Defect, 68
TEMP. L. REV. 167, 189 (1995).
204. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
205. See, Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Corp., 451 A.2d 179, 181-82 (N.J.
I 982).
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burden of proving negligence "does not necessarily deny that fault is the
underlying motivation for [strict] liability."206
An injured plaintiff cannot escape some modicum of proof. Even
under pure strict liability, a product or design must still be deemed
defective before liability arises.2°7 Requiring proof that a defect exists
is inevitably the virtual equivalent of requiring proof of fault on a
negligence standard. As Professor William Powers puts it:
After making the original decision to [make] ... [strict] liability based on
defectiveness, courts have encountered difficulty defining defectiveness in a
way that is both workable and maintains the distinction between strict products
liability and negligence ....
If courts define[] "defect" as "a product that injures the plaintiff," strict
products liability would be in fact a version of true strict liability. If, on the
other hand, courts define[] "defect" as "a product negligently manufactured,"
strict products liability would be merely a version of negligence parading under
another banner . . . .
No court has ever defined "defect" to mean "any product condition that
causes injury to a plaintiff ...." 208

Attempts to define defectiveness in California have undertones of a
negligence standard. As will be discussed in the next section, the
California tests of (1) ordinary consumer expectations and (2) riskbenefit, which are used to determine if a design is "defective," approximate the rationale behind the Nebraska Rule--a fault standard. It is for
this reason that the Nebraska Rule is compatible with California strict
liability law.

206. William Powers, Jr., A Modest Proposal to Abandon Strict Products Liability,
1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 639, 648; Prosser, supra note 158, at 1114 ("Where the action is
against the manufacturer of the product, an honest estimate might very well be that there
is not one case in a hundred in which strict liability would result in recovery where
negligence does not."); see also Wertheimer, supra note 201, at 1192-93; Frank J.
Vandall, "Design Defect" in Products Liability: Rethinking Negligence and Strict
Liability, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 61 (1982).
207. Michalko, 451 A.2d at 183 ("The focus in a strict liability case is upon the
product itself."). The New Jersey Supreme Court also offered another explanation for
the difference between strict liability and negligence. "[N]egligence is conduct-oriented,
asking whether defendant's actions were reasonable; strict liability is product-oriented,
asking whether the product was reasonably safe for its foreseeable purposes." Beshada
v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 544 (N.J. I 982).
208. Powers, supra note 206, at 652; Wertheimer, supra note 201, at I 191 ("The
requirement that a product be defective before the manufacturer would be held
responsible for the damage it caused opened the door to the transformation of strict
products liability back into a negligence doctrine.").
The Barker court also acknowledged this difficult aspect of defining defectiveness.
"California courts have frequently recognized that the defectiveness concept defies a
simple, uniform definition applicable to all sectors of the diverse product liability
domain." Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 417, 573 P.2d 443, 446, 143
Cal. Rptr. 225, 228 (1978).
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2.

Defining Design Defects In California

In order for an injured plaintiff to recover in strict liability, the product
in question must be deemed defective. After the California Supreme
Court's rejection of Restatement (Second) section 402A's standard of
"unreasonably dangerous,"209 the court created a standard for defining
design defects in Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., Jnc., 210 which includes two
alternative standards. The standards for defining a defective design are
premised on fault. This suggests the requirement of proving fault in the
Nebraska Rule is no more cumbersome than fulfilling the burden of
proving a design defect. In fact, "[t]he Barker factors involve an
evaluation of [a] manufacturer's reasonable care just as the negligence
factors do."211 Because the Barker test involves two separate tests,
they will be discussed separately.
(a)

Ordinary Consumer Expectation Test

According to the Barker court, "a product is defective in design . . .
if the product has failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer
would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable
manner."212 The court stressed that this standard assures a plaintiff
protection from products that do not meet expected safety standards. 213
The standard resembles proving that a manufacturer was at fault for
producing the product.
What the test says is that a party is liable for a defect when that party
has failed to meet consumer expectations of safety. The focus of inquiry
is on what consumers expect. However, in general, "consumer
expectations do not provide an independent standard against which to
judge a product."214 The product may be so complex that a consumer
is unable to fathom the appropriate safety standards. Alternatively, a
danger may be so blatant that it cannot be said that a consumer would
209. Cronin v. JEB Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121,133,501 P.2d 1153, 1162, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 433,442 (1972).
210. 20 Cal. 3d 413,432,573 P.2d 443, 455-56, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 237-38 (1978).
211. Wildman & Farrell, supra note 10, at 151.
212. Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 418, 573 P.2d at 446, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
213. Id.
214. Powers, supra note 206, at 653; see also Price, supra note 69, at 1315
(explaining that the consumer expectation test is problematic).
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not expect to receive an injury from it. 215 Given the sporadic oscillation of possible consumer expectations, a court's inquiry would reflect
back to whether a defendant failed to meet these standards, however they
are defined. In essence, the very nature of proving a product's design
did not meet the ordinary consumer's idea of safety is the same as
proving a party was at fault for producing a sub-standard design.
In the context of a non-designing manufacturer that conforms to the
specifications of a buyer, there is a strong tendency to want to frame the
issue in terms of a fault standard. The Nebraska Rule is preferable
because it focuses on the buyer's design and asks if a reasonable
manufacturer would have followed it. By contrast, the consumer
expectation test focuses on abstract notions of what consumers expect in
a particular situation, and once this is established, the design is then
defined as defective if the defendant has not met these expectations. 216
A defendant is then "strictly liable" if the defect caused an injury. The
Nebraska Rule provides a more clear and consistent criteria. 217

(b)

The "Risk-Benefit" Test

An injured plaintiff in a strict products liability suit has a second

215. Two main arguments have been made to counter the consumer expectations
test. One is the "obvious danger defense." See Wertheimer, supra note 201, at 1197-99.
For example, could it not be argued that an ordinary and reasonable consumer expects
that her hand will be injured when put into the closing cylinders of a transformer press?
Under the obvious danger defense, it is argued that an ordinary consumer would expect
to be injured, such that strict liability is thus, obviated.
The second argument is that "[i]n most design [defect] cases the offending product
feature is too complex to generate concrete consumer expectations." Powers, supra note
206, at 653. In the context of manufacturers conforming to a buyer's plans and
specifications, we are often dealing with intricate machinery and heavy duty equipment.
These products are not for widespread public use and consumers, as a group, are
unfamiliar with them. Hence, consumers would not have firm expectations on how these
products are supposed to operate. Considering these two arguments, the consumer
expectation test may make the standard of proving defectiveness, and thus liability, even
more difficult for an injured plaintiff. Consequently, the tentative draft of the Third
Restatement rejects the consumer expectation test. See THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note
93, § 2(b) cmt. e, at 23.
2 I 6. If the defendant does not meet the expectations, one could say the defendant
was at fault for not doing so. The defendant's failure to meet the standard justifies
holding the defendant strictly liable.
217. In other words, courts following the Nebraska Rule do not have to struggle in
figuring out precisely what consumer expectations are. In every case, the focus is on
whether a design is defective and, insofar as the manufacturer is concerned, whether a
reasonable manufacturer that was similarly situated would have followed it. The
standard of judgment-fault-is a consistent one. Conversely, under the consumer
expectations test, the standard of judgment varies according to whatever consumer
expectations are defined as in a particular case involving a particular product. See
generally Price, supra note 69.
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option in proving a product's design was defective: the "risk-benefit"
test. A plaintiff must show that a product's design proximately caused
the plaintiff's injury. 218 At that point the inquiry becomes whether the
benefits of the design exceed the inherent risks the design presents.
Under this standard, the burden shifts to the defendant. This second step
is the functional equivalent of presuming the manufacturer is at fault2 19
and then giving the manufacturer the opportunity to overcome the
presumption. In effect, the manufacturer that can disprove negligence
can likewise prevent a finding of defectiveness. If the manufacturer
shows the risks do not outweigh the benefits, the manufacturer will not
be "at fault." The Barker risk-benefit test is like the Hand Formula for
negligence. 220 "[I]n weighing the benefits and risks associated with a
product it is difficult to appreciate any significant difference between a
focus on the design of the product and a focus on the act of designing
the product."221 The risk-benefit test is just another way to determine
fault.
When dealing with the issue of liability for a design defect in the
context of a manufacturer that follows the specifications of a buyer,
218. Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 413,432, 573 P.2d 443,456, 143
Cal. Rptr. 225, 238 (1978).
219. See Wildman & Farrell, supra note 10, at 150-51; see also Birnbaum, supra
note 69.
220. The similarity between a "risk-benefit" test and the Learned Hand equation for
determining negligence is striking. Both tests are analyzed together supra note 85; see
also Powers, supra note 206, at 654.
221. Diamond, supra note 197, at 538. "In either case the risk of the product's
design would be balanced against its benefits in determining whether the product is
defective or the designer is negligent. This balancing is a classic element of negligence." Id. at n.60. However, it is important to note that in applying the risk-benefit
test, the jury is allowed to use hindsight. Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 430, 573 P.2d at 454, 143
Cal. Rptr. at 236. This is the only thing that separates the risk-benefit standard from a
pure negligence standard. See Diamond, supra note 197, at 538 (Hindsight is "a
potentially significant difference between negligence and strict liability as articulated by
Barker's second prong."); Powers, supra note 206, at 655 ("[I]n [determining] defectiveness, all actual risks known at the time of trial count against the manufacturer, whether
the manufacturer reasonably could have foreseen them at the time of sale.").
Hence, even if a risk was technologically unforeseeable at the time of production,
according to the buyer's plans and specifications, any defect in the plans and
specifications would be evaluated at the time of trial. If technology advances in the
interim between injury and trial, the non-designing manufacturer would be judged by the
advances in technology. Yet even in cases where hindsight may be effective, the
California Supreme Court has recently established the "state of the art" defense. See,
e.g., Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 53 Cal. 3d 987, 810 P.2d 549, 281
Cal. Rptr. 528 (1991) (en bane).
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there is an axiomatic urge to want to place liability with the party at
fault. Lay jurors, exercising common sense more than theoretical legal
analysis, would feel that holding a non-designing manufacturer strictly
liable for an unforeseeably defective design is improper. If the New
Jersey Rule is applied, using the risk-benefit test to determine defectiveness allows the jury to consider a variety of grounds to exculpate an
innocent manufacturer. 222 But the risk-benefit test could also work to
frustrate the goal of victim compensation by enabling even culpable
manufacturers to escape liability. For instance, under the risk-benefit
test, it is conceivable that a culpable manufacturer could escape liability
by arguing that even though a reasonable manufacturer would not have
followed a buyer's design, the defendant manufacturer is not liable
because a safety device is not mechanically feasible and hence, the
design is not defective.
Furthermore, the risk-benefit test calls on jurors to determine fault
using abstract notions of whether a particular product's benefits outweigh
its dangers. The Nebraska Rule is a more direct and equitable means of
determining fault because it concentrates on a manufacturer's actions and
asks whether the manufacturer was reasonable in following a buyer's
design. Because strict liability suits alleging design defects in California
are based on what appear to be fault-type standards, the Nebraska Rule's
requirement of showing fault by a non-designing manufacturer is
compatible with California tort law. In addition, the Nebraska Rule
blends well with the California Supreme Court's recent decline in the
application of strict liability.

3.

A Decline In California s Strict Products Liability Application

In recent cases, California courts have restricted the application of
strict liability. The courts seem concerned with excessive liability and
the best means of carrying out many of the public policy goals of strict
liability. 223 The Nebraska Rule blends with these reforms. Recent

222. In determining whether the risks of a design outweigh the benefits, the trier of
fact, under the Barker opinion, may consider the "mechanical feasibility of a safer
alternative design," the cost ofa safer design, the gravity of the potential danger inherent
in the design, the likelihood that the danger would cause injury, and any potential
adverse consequences that could result to the product or the consumer ftom an
alternative design. Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
The plaintiff would be at a disadvantage because the plaintiff would have to be
knowledgeable on the mechanics and technology of the design in order to contest a
manufacturer's claim of design competence. See Wildman & Farrell, supra note 10, at
153. Moreover, a manufacturer could potentially escape liability, for example, if it could
convince a jury that another design would "cost too much."
223. See, e.g., supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
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California Supreme Court cases represent major restrictions on strict
liability.
In Murphy v. Squibb & Sons, lnc., 224 the California Supreme Court
held that retailers of prescription drugs are exempt from strict liability.
This seriously contracts strict liability. Normally, plaintiffs could sue
anyone in the supply chain to recover damages.225 Through indemnity
actions, defendants could supposedly shift liability to the party who
caused the defect. 226 Murphy exonerates one class of defendants that
were not primarily responsible for the defect, even vis-a-vis the innocent
victims.
The situation parallels non-designing manufacturers. Neither the
retailers of prescription drugs nor non-designing manufacturers that
follow a buyer's design are responsible for a defect that causes injury.
In holding that retailers were not liable to the victim, the Murphy court
squarely rejected the argument that, as between an innocent victim and
an innocent seller, the innocent seller should bear the loss. That
argument played a significant role in supporting the New Jersey Rule.
Without it, the New Jersey Rule loses weight. Also, in Brown v.
Superior Court, 227 the Barker test was held not to apply to manufacturers of prescription drugs; strict liability would not be applied in design
and warning cases. As a result, only proof of negligence would invoke
liability in these cases. 228 The California Supreme Court has thus
recognized that the Barker test for design defects is premised on notions
of proving fault. 229
On a more general level, the California Supreme Court recently put a

224. 40 Cal. 3d 627, 710 P.2d 247, 221 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1985).
225. E.g.. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725,739,575 P.2d 1162, 1170,
144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 388 (I 978) ("Regardless of the identity of a particular defendant or
of his position in the commercial chain the basis for his liability remains that he has
marketed or distributed a defective product.").
226. See supra part V.B.3(a).
227. 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 751 P.2d 470, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1988).
228. See id.
229. The California Supreme Court has also retracted the impact of the Barker test
by introducing the "state of the art" defense. Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass
Corp., 53 Cal. 3d 987, 810 P.2d 549, 281 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1991) (en bane). Recall that
the Barker opinion held that hindsight could be used to determine defectiveness. See
supra note 221. Anderson dealt with strict liability in a failure to warn case. See
Anderson, 53 Cal. 3d at 997, 1000, 1003, 810 P.2d at 555, 557, 559, 281 Cal. Rptr. at
534, 536, 538.
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halt to the expansion of strict liability. In Peterson v. Superior
Court,23° the court held that "neither landlords nor hotel proprietors are
strictly liable . . . for injuries to their respective tenants and guests
caused by a defect in the premises. " 231 The problem, according to the
Peterson court, was that in holding a landlord or hotel proprietor strictly
liable, a party without a connection to the defect would unjustly face
liability. 232
"(T]he decision in Becker went far beyond holding
landlords liable for injuries caused by their own fault, and imposed
liability for injuries caused by defects that the landlord had not created
233
"
The California Supreme Court was uncomfortable with
imposing liability on a party that had not created a defect. A nondesigning manufacturer is like a hotel proprietor-a non-designing
manufacturer does not create a design defect, the designer does.
Because the Nebraska Rule comports with the rationale of Peterson--a
refusal to impose liability without fault---the Nebraska Rule would be a
logical next step for the California Supreme Court.
The above cases deal with issues where strict liability proves too much
for cases in which the level of actual fault is non-existent or relatively
low. The Nebraska Rule comports with these notions. There is
something onerous in holding a blameless, non-designing manufacturer
strictly liable for a buyer's design. The Nebraska Rule limits liability to
the manufacturer that fails to exercise due care in carrying out the plans
and specifications of a buyer. This is natural and fair. As the above
cases illustrate, the Nebraska Rule fits into California's contemporary
tort law.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The California Supreme Court should adopt the Nebraska Rule and
refuse to hold a non-designing manufacturer strictly liable for a defect
in a buyer's design. The court should impose liability only where the
manufacturer is at fault for complying with a buyer's design. Compared
to the strict liability approach of the New Jersey Rule, the Nebraska Rule
approximates the goals of deterrence, enterprise liability, and victim
compensation in a manner that is more efficient and fair. Only culpable
parties face the burden of liability. Whereas the Nebraska Rule rejects

230. IO Cal. 4th I 185, 899 P.2d 905, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 836 (1995).
231. Id. at I 188-89, 899 P.2d at 906, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 837. This expressly
overruled the portion of Becker v. !RM Corp., 38 Cal. 3d 454, 698 P.2d 116, 213 Cal.
Rptr. 2 I 3 ( 1985), that held that landlords could be held strictly liable.
232. But cf NOLAN & URSIN, supra note I 08.
233. Peterson, 10 Cal. 4th at 1197, 899 P.2d at 912, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 843
(emphasis added).
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imposing liability without fault, the New Jersey Rule holds nondesigning manufacturers strictly liable for design defects and then
attempts to eliminate the burden ofliability through notions of indemnity
and liability insurance. Because the injured parties are usually the
employees of the designing buyer, workers' compensation frustrates the
New Jersey Rule's reliance on indemnity and insurance as justifications
for imposing liability without fault. The result is that the New Jersey
Rule imposes liability on innocent manufacturers in situations that shield
buyers who are culpable for design defects.
The Nebraska Rule is desirable for California given the California
Supreme Court's recent reduction in the application of strict liability.
The California Supreme Court has recently become concerned with
excessive liability and has accordingly refused to extend strict liability
to cases where there are low levels of fault, such as in the retailing of
prescription drugs. By comparison, when a non-designing manufacturer
is reasonable in following a buyer's design, a similar situation exists
where there is actually no fault on behalf of the manufacturer. Nondesigning manufacturers should thus be treated like retailers of
prescription drugs. The Nebraska Rule achieves this end. Furthermore,
both the consumer expectations test and the risk-benefit test, which are
used in California strict liability cases to determine whether a design is
defective, resemble standards used to determine fault. Thus, the
Nebraska Rule's insistence on holding a non-designing manufacturer
liable for a design defect only upon proof of fault will complement the
criteria of California strict products liability law and should be adopted
by the California Supreme Court. The Nebraska Rule not only provides
another means of containing California's liberal application of strict
liability, it is, more importantly, the most logical and fair approach to
dealing with non-designing manufacturers that have used due care.
BRENT NICHOLAS TRIFF
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